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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR
BY
LI ZHANG
NOVEMBER 15, 2005
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics
The main theme of this dissertation is government’s strategic behaviors. We
show that different budget structures give governments incentives to behave differently,
and that the Leviathan model and the Bureaucratic model are better in modeling
government behaviors than the median voter model. We first discuss theoretically the
design of an optimal tax system, promoting the Leviathan government to maximize social
welfare in order to maximize its own revenue. Then we examine empirically how
government behaviors vary with different budget structures.
In essay I, we apply the Buchanan-Brennan (B-B) rule to examine the effects of a
tax system on the efficiency of agricultural production in the context of Chinese local
governments, which receive insufficient control from the central and are free from the
pressure from local residents due to asymmetric information and lack of horizontal
accountability. We extend the B-B rule to include the incentive issues and the risk sharing,
and also their trade-off. Farmers and the agricultural sector assume significant roles in the
national economy of China, while the under-provision of public infrastructures and the

x

risks involved negatively affect agricultural production and therefore impede economic
growth. Within the principal-agent framework, we illustrate how the problem is inherent
in the agriculture tax system in China and propose our solution of special earmarking.
In essay II, we test empirically for the government’s strategic behaviors. We argue
that the environmental performance is affected by government policy. Therefore it relates
inherently to the budget structure and government incentives. With an illustrating model
between structure of revenue and expenditure and pollution level, we propose three
hypotheses, which state that the lower the ratio of business related tax in total revenue,
the higher the ratio of property tax in total revenue, the higher the share of health
expenditure in total expenditure, the government will have higher incentive to control
pollution and thus the pollution level is lower. Our empirical evidence provides support to
our hypotheses, which show that structures of revenue and expenditure do affect the
government’s incentives to control pollution. Therefore, changes in the budget structure
might be helpful to achieve better environmental performance.

xi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
DOES GOVERNMENT BEHAVE STRATEGICALLY?
It is well known that taxes can distort the decision makers’ incentive structures in
an economy. Examining the impact of taxes on the behavior of economic agents is one of
the most important issues in public finance theory. For example, in most of the public
finance textbooks, the core consists of the impacts of tax on people’s labor supply, saving,
investment decisions, and the way people deal with risks. However, the government itself
is assumed not to be affected by taxes in the traditional standard analysis framework.
One of the justifications may be that economists believe in the median voter model.
According to this model, the interests of citizens eventually govern government behavior
(Rosen 1999).
Generally speaking, there have been three approaches to model government
behaviors in the public finance literature: the median voter model, the Leviathan model
and the Bureaucratic model. 1
The median voter model is the most popular theoretical framework in the
literature that deals with government behavior. Since government officials are elected by
the general public, they can only stay in power if they satisfy the preference of the public.
Due to the diversity of the preferences of different individuals, government officials can
1

The ideal case of a benevolent social planner, who maximizes social welfare, even though socially as well as
economically optimal, does not exist in the real world, therefore is not considered here.
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only be elected or re-elected if they accommodate the majority residents’ preference.
Under certain conditions, the median voter’s preference will win over in majority voting.
Therefore government officials need to satisfy median voter’s preference in order to stay
in power or get elected. There is a vast literature that has tested the median voter model.
To name a few, there is the pioneer work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and
Bergstrom and Goodman (1975), Holcombe (1980), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), and
more recently, Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994).
Some observed facts make the median voter model flawed, however. For example,
there exists an asymmetric information problem. The effectiveness of election depends
crucially on the information on the candidates, while it is expensive for voters to collect
this kind of information.
Alternatively, the government can be modeled as an organization with its own
interests. In other words, the government is assumed to behave like an individual
decision-maker, like a consumer or a firm. Since the citizens may not be able to control
the government very effectively, the government may be trying to maximize its potential
revenue sources, or using minimum resources to meet some requirements. This is the
so-called Leviathan model, originated from Brennan and Buchanan, who describe
government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan 1977, 1978,
1980). This Leviathan has an inherent tendency to maximize budgetary revenue;
therefore the size of the government tends to be bigger than optimal. In the literature, the
Leviathan model states that the more decentralized the government structure, the more

3

tax competition among decentralized governments will put restrictions on the
government’s intrusion into the economy, therefore, the smaller the size of the
government. There is also a literature that elaborated on the validity of this model, and
many studies arrived at different results. For example, Oates (1985) found no relationship
between decentralization and government size, while Stein (1999) found that fiscal
decentralization led to larger governments in Latin America; and some case studies found
a negative relationship between decentralization and government spending, such as
Marlow (1988) and Grossman (1989). Rodden (2002) differentiated between
decentralization funded by intergovernmental transfer and local taxation, and
demonstrated that in the former case, governments grow faster, while in the latter
decentralization limits the growth of governments.
Also, even if the governments care about the interests of the residents, it may be
difficult for the elected officials to control the behaviors of employees, or the bureaucrats
in the government. 2 According to the so-called Bureaucratic model developed mainly by
Niskanen (1968; 1971), bureaus are monopoly suppliers of the services they provide,
with political sponsors as their monopoly buyers. And bureaus exchange a specific output
with the political sponsors for a specific budget, unlike producers who trade other
merchandises (Niskanen 1968). As he realized later, during the process of exchange,
there exists bargaining between these two parties. Also the bureaus have information
advantages on the production costs, while the sponsors do not have incentives to monitor
2

Or even worse, the elected officials are bureaucrats themselves.
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the behaviors of the bureaus. In addition, Bureaucrats have their own utility functions,
including “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of
managing the bureau, and ease of making changes” (Niskanen 1975). Therefore
bureaucrats will try to maximize their own interests, instead of maximizing the public
interests. In term of budgetary behavior, bureaucrats will try to maximize the size of the
their budget, in order to get more out of it, of course subject to the cost constraint of
producing certain output. Later on, Niskanen modified his previous argument and
pointed out that the bureaucrats maximize their discretionary budgets, or “the difference
between his total budget and the minimum cost of producing the expected output”
(Niskanen 1975, 1994). Niskanen also provided some empirical evidence on the
overspending behaviors of the bureaus (Niskanen 1975).
Actually, Niskanen believed the reason that the governments choose bureaus as
inefficient providers of government services instead of choosing more efficient private
provision is that by so doing a net surplus is generated that can be shared with the
members of the governments. Therefore, “most of the problems often attributed to
bureaus are more fundamentally caused by the structure and decision rules of the
legislature, for which bureaus are merely their preferred agents.” (Niskanen 1994)
Both of these last two theories posit that governments are similar to individuals,
behaving in their own interests, reacting to different incentives, even though from
different angles.

5

The Government Does Behave Strategically
In these three different models above, the latter two take into account the
governments’ or government officials’ strategic behaviors, which we may apply to
explain some phenomena that cannot be explained by the median voter model. A lot of
studies that we are going to talk about in the following have been attempting to explain
the real world experience by relating to governments’ strategic behaviors, both
theoretically and empirically.
McGuire (1999) reassessed the empirical outcomes on state-imposed limits on
local property taxes. She found evidences that support the Leviathan hypothesis, rather
than the median voter model.
Following Brennan and Buchanan, Glaeser (1995) examines the incentive issues
behind the expenditure behavior of local governments. For a revenue-maximizing
Leviathan, it is always in its interests to expand its tax base. In the context of property
taxes, what the local government needs to do is to provide amenities. The quantities and
qualities of amenities determine property values, based on which the local government
collects its revenues. That explains why government has incentives to spend on
amenities.
Observing that during the process of transition from planned economy to market
economy, Eastern European countries and China have taken completely different paths in
treating the new non-state-owned or private firms, Gordon and Li (1997) brought up their
explanation. Local governments in China often support the new firms in order to gain the
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related taxes and maybe part of the profits (Wong 1991). However, local governments in
Eastern Europe economies often took a negative attitude toward the new firms
(Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Shleifer et al. 1996). To explain this, Gordon and Li link
the difference of attitude toward new firms to the incentives faced by the two kinds of
governments. They argue that the revenues of local governments in China highly depend
on the new firms, while in other transition countries taxes mainly come from the existing
state-owned firms. Therefore, different tax structures give governments different
incentives to treat new firms. This shows that governments respond strategically to the
different incentives provided by the tax systems.
Gordon and Wilson (1999; 2003) explore how the relationship “between tax
structure and each bureau’s budget can affect the policy choices made by these officials”
(Wilson and Gordon 2003). They observe the absence of government in the discussion of
optimal taxation, arguing that the taxation system cannot be optimized unless we take
into account the response of government officials to the tax structure. Their conclusion is
that government officials always prefer the policies that can expand tax bases. For
example, in terms of environmental policy, governments are most likely to choose
Pigovian tax over allocating free permits to the current firms. The reason is that the
Pigovian tax can contribute the revenue increase to governments, while the latter cannot.
Local government in China provides another good example to analyze the
incentives behind government behavior. Due to the characteristics and special roles of
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Chinese local governments in illustrating the governments’ strategic behaviors, some
empirical studies examining Chinese local government behaviors are worth noticing.
As we will discuss in detail later, there is no horizontal accountability in the
political system in China, because local officials are not subject to the re-election
pressure, and most of them are appointed by the higher-level government. In determining
the appointment and promotion of local government officials, revenue that they collect is
usually one of the most important criteria. Under this context, local government has very
strong incentive to maximize the revenue that can be collected. It is interesting to note
that before the 1994 tax reform, local governments were able to manipulate the tax rate
and the tax base to maximize the revenue they could collect in their jurisdictions. The
1994 tax reform assigned the power to change the tax rates only to the central
government. This restriction itself is a response by the central government to the previous
strategic behavior of Chinese local governments under incompatible incentives. Local
governments try to increase their own revenues at the cost of reducing central
government revenues. Wong (1991; 1992) documented some serious problems of
Chinese local governments. For example, Wong wrote, “they [the three features of the
tax system] have created problems of persistent overinvestment, duplication, regional
blockades, and continuing bureaucratic management of industry” (Wong 1992). There
even existed some regional barriers to resources flows, such as in the case of the “wool

8

war” and the “silk cocoon wars” (Wong 1991). 3 These kinds of behaviors surely were
rational responses of local government to the tax system, because in those days the most
important tax was from the manufacturing activities. The central government issued a lot
of regulations, trying to put an end to these behaviors, but the regulations hardly ever
worked since the inherent incentives encouraged the local governments to circumvent
and not comply with them.
Huang (1995) shows how the local governments’ investment behaviors respond
strategically to the monitor of the central government. In the 1980s the Chinese economy
was still controlled by the central plan. But the central plan suffered from high
monitoring cost. For some investments, it was easier to monitor and control; for some
others, however, the monitoring cost was pretty high. With renovation investment and
construction investment as examples, Huang shows that in the 1980s the Chinese local
governments always chose to invest more on renovation, on which the monitoring costs
by the central government were higher, so they can take advantage of the central
government’s inability to effectively monitor and therefore harvest the benefits of
noncompliance.
For a Leviathan-like government, as in the case of China, if it lasts more than one
period, it will try to allocate the current resources to maximize the expected future
3

As Wong (1991) put it, in response to the decline of resources allocated by the central government to the local
governments, they try to protect local tax bases, and one of the consequences is the regional protectionism. Due to the
dependence of local revenue on the development of local enterprises, local governments promote local tax bases by
supporting local economic growth, or “intervene whenever possible to protect their resources and markets”. They ban
the free flow of wool and silk cocoon prompted by market mechanism between localities, in so doing bringing about
the outbreaks of “wool wars” and “silk cocoon wars”.
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revenue. The local government may behave exactly like an investor in that where to
spend the current resources will depend crucially on the expected payoffs from the
“projects” in the present period. If some public sector projects cannot bring back tax
revenue, the local government will not spend much on them, unless it is required to do so
by the central government. In their article, Zhou and Zhao (2002) show that in the two
Chinese townships, the government expenditures on the agricultural sector are only
3.39% and 1.37% respectively. This is partly due to the fact that the Chinese current
agriculture tax is fixed and not related to agriculture production, and spending on
agriculture and increase production will not bring more revenue. As a consequence,
governments have no incentive to invest in the agricultural sector. This will be the object
of our analysis later. On the other hand, the expenditures on education are 48.33% and
22.85% respectively. Such a high share of resources were allocated to education, even
though it can not bring about revenue in the short run, because the central government
mandates that the local governments give priority to education in their budgets. In
addition, the two township governments paid 5.49% and 2.91% of their revenues to their
tax administrations. Compared with the tax administration in the United States, which
costs only around $10 for $1000 revenue collected, or 1% of the revenue, the situation in
China clearly shows a substantial X-efficiency in the local public sectors. 4
In addition, differences in tax base give local governments different incentives,
which in turn lead to different expenditure behaviors. Han (2002) and Zhao (2002)

4

For further information, please refer to the following website:
http://www.co.fairfax.va.us/gov/omb/pdf/Volume1/00157.pdf, last retrieved Nov. 08, 2005.
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investigate the expenditure behaviors of three less developed county governments in
China. Zhou and Zhao (2002) provide a picture of how a local government in a rich
prefecture allocates its fiscal resources. From their studies we can see that there
obviously exists some difference between the behavioral patterns of rich local
governments and poor local governments. The difference is exactly the consequences of
different governments’ revenue maximization behaviors. The tax bases for governments
in rich and poor area are different, since the government in the rich area collects its
revenues mainly from industrial activities, while the government in the poor area may
rely heavily on agriculture sector for its revenue. For the former, the tax bases are related
to the industry production, so the local government spends a lot in outlets that are
conducive to production expansion in order to collect more revenue. For the latter, the
local government fulfills its revenue objective by imposing heavy levies over and above
the fixed agriculture tax and exploiting the farmers. While the agriculture tax is not
related to the agriculture production, the public goods provision in agriculture sector is
not conducive to the revenue increase, which gives local governments little incentive to
expend on agriculture sector.
The above review tells us that governments do take on strategic behaviors. More
fundamentally, evidences show that the governments behave differently under different
tax structures. It is safe to draw a conclusion that even though in countries where
government officials are elected by the voters, election by itself may impose restrictions
on the behaviors of government officials and thus affect government behavior, it is not
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guaranteed that government will behave completely in the voters’ interests. More
importantly, modeling government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan might be a better
choice in an economy where election does not exist. This demonstrates that the
assumption in traditional public finance literature that governments are free of the impact
from taxes is unrealistic, and therefore it needs to be reconsidered.
In addition, the strategic behaviors by the governments take many forms and have
significant welfare effects, as exhibited by the strategic behaviors of some local county
governments in China. In Tuanfeng County, Hubei Province, for instance, the county
governor dismissed the County Office of Environmental Protection in 2003. The
governor made this decision because the environmental protection office “disturbed” the
local firms’ production activities, making products manufactured by the industries within
the county more expensive and thus less competitive. Thus the environmental office was
dismissed because its behaviors threatened the county’s tax base. Another example is also
from Hubei Province, China. The governor of Jianli County took a big step on reforming
education system, selling all profitable elementary and middle schools to private
investors and meanwhile shutting down those non-profitable schools (Liu 2003). By
doing so, the county government no longer had to allocate budgetary expenditure on
education, which could not bring about any immediate tax revenue.
These examples show how a “bad” constitution can have seriously negative
welfare effects. In the first case, local government collects revenue from industries,
rather than from property. If there is a conflict between environmental protection and the
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expansion of the tax base, letting the firms continue their production and therefore
continue to pollute would be optimal for the sake of protecting local government’s tax
base. Therefore a rational choice is to “dismiss” the environment office. In this process
the interests of the local residents are being sacrificed, however. In the second case, it
may be irrational for local officials to allocate a big share of budget to education because,
from the perspective of the local government, education is thought to be a pure expense
without any immediate return. After the reform, education becomes an industry from
which private investors can charge high tuitions and make profits. Children in that county
can no longer enjoy free compulsory education and it will become difficult for children
from poor families to afford education. These kinds of government behavior demonstrate
that it is really important to take into account the incentive issues in the design of tax
structure.
As discussed above, the governments do behave differently under different tax
structures. Therefore, in term of efficiency, optimal tax design is of great importance.
This issue is more important for economies in which voting system does not work very
well. An observed fact is that the government in advanced economies is subject to
horizontal accountability, since in these economies, the re-election is a pressure for the
government officials. Therefore the officials should take into full account the interests of
the general public and are accountable horizontally to them, in order to gain their votes.
In some countries like China, however, the local government officials are appointed by
the higher-level government therefore there is only vertical accountability in that the
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officials are accountable vertically to their superiors and care about the preferences of the
higher-level government. In this context, local officials would not respect the interests of
residents in their justifications and this horizontal accountability does not exist, unless
the residents’ interests are related to those of the higher-level government.
Combating the Revenue Maximization of a Leviathan-like Government
Various examples exhibit that the governments do take on strategic behaviors,
then the problem now is how to combat their strategic behaviors. For a Leviathan-like
government, seeking for ways of dealing with their revenue maximization should be in
place.
What is an optimal constitution, or optimal tax structure in general? 5 From the
perspective of the traditional framework, the answer lies in minimizing the excess burden
associated with some given revenues. Ramsey rule gives a good solution, but it considers
efficiency only (Ramsey 1927). Also, the Diamond Rule is another choice if we take into
account horizontal equity (Diamond 1975).
For a Leviathan-like government, the social planner’s problem is not only to
minimize the excess burden for given government revenue, but also to deal with
government’s strategic behaviors. The government has both incentives and discrete
power to manipulate the “investment” of the current resources in order to harvest future
returns. In other words, all the current resources will be optimally, in term of revenues

5

We think it would be interesting to expand the analysis to include expenditure so we can discuss budget structure in a
more comprehensive way, like we will do in the second essay.
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will be collected in the future, allocated to the sectors that can yield highest returns. In
this sense, the local government behaves likes a corporation (Oi 1996). The Leviathan
government may spend nothing on some public sectors if they cannot “harvest” tax
revenues from them according to the constitution (tax structure), while allocating
subsidies to the sectors contributing to revenue growth. 6 In this sense, the optimal choice
surely should include the efficiency issue.
When it comes to efficiency, there is an important issue that needs to be stressed.
In order to collect more revenue, improving on the efficiency of tax administration,
taking into consideration both the tax capacity on one hand and the tax collection efforts
on the other, is assuming a significant role. However, with the objective of dealing with
the strategic behaviors of local governments in this volume, we pretty much leave this
issue out. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it plays a very important role in enlarging
tax revenue collection in the context of the tax system in China.
Among the models examined above, the median voter model has a built-in
mechanism to limit government behavior: voting. If the government official does not
satisfy the preference of the median voter, which stands for the majority election’s
preference, he will be voted out of the office. Therefore, being accountable horizontally
to the public is a must for government officials behaving purely in the voters’ interests.
If the governments are not constrained by the election pressure as in a democratic
system, neither are the governments like the market-preserving federalism type that
6

In this paper, sometimes “constitution” and “tax structure” are used interchangeably.
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Weingast et. al. present, what constraint can we construct to put a limit on the behaviors
of governments (Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997)? 7
Basically, two approaches can be followed for dealing with the Leviathan-like
governments. The first one is to let the governments compete with each other. The
competition can be realized in two ways. One is to decentralize powers in the hands of
central governments to local governments. Not only can lower level of governments
better accommodate the preferences of local residents, but also voters at the local level
are in a better position than central government to monitor local government behaviors,
thus decentralization can solve at least part of the asymmetric information problem. In
this respect, there is going to be efficiency gain by inducing competition among local
governments. There are also costs involved in term of the loss in efficiency in the
economies of scale and scope. The other is fragmentation. For powers already in the
hands of the local governments, we can artificially build more governments at the same
level, and then let the constructed market work as an intermediate mechanism to reshape
government behaviors. There is a huge literature on the effects of decentralization and
fragmentation on government behaviors (Nelson 1986; Oates 1985; Zax 1989). However,
the induced competition may not work effectively when governments behave
strategically.

7

The theory of market preserving federalism advocated by Weingast, Qian et al. states that, under the conditions of
hierarchy shaped and institutionalized clearly divided assignment of government responsibilities with the authority of
the local governments over the local economy, hard budget constraint for all level of governments, formation of
common market to ensure the mobility of factors across localities, the vertically separated and decentralized federalism
is actually a effective mechanism to preserve market incentives. For details, see Qian and Weingast (1996; 1997) and
others.
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Alternatively, we can use direct measures to make governments behave desirably.
In terms of constitutional economics (McKenzie 1984), in order to limit Leviathan’s
taxing power, the only way is to lay some rules at the constitutional stage, which means
to erect legal restrictions, stipulating what can be done and what cannot be done before
constitution is established. Proposition 13 in California is one of the most famous cases.
At the after-constitutional stage, however, voters may not have effective measures
to make government behave desirably, even when the government is under the pressure
of pursuing re-election (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
What we should be concerned with here is to make the tax structure compatible
with the incentives of government. Public goods provision is important to both the
consumption and production activities. If voters could not control government tax
collection behaviors, they would not be able to control the government expenditure
behaviors. One view, as proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1978), can be used to solve
this problem. In their path-breaking research, Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1978; 1980)
“drop the central assumption that budgetary spending and taxes are determined through
an effectively democratic voting process in the postconstitutional period” (Brennan and
Buchanan 1978). Instead, they assume that voters can set up rules to constrain
government, which is assumed to be a selfish organization trying to maximize its own
interests. For different rules placed by the voters, the government may respond very
differently. If voters cannot effectively monitor government behaviors, the government
does not have incentives to satisfy voters’ preferences. Therefore, it is optimal for
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government, in some circumstances, not to spend on those outlets that are important to
voters but are not conducive to the growth of government revenues. Under this
circumstance, the optimal choice for voters is to induce “a Leviathan-like government to
provide the public goods and services that taxpayer-beneficiaries desire” (Brennan and
Buchanan 1978). From Brennan and Buchanan’s perspective, the basic rule is to relate
tax base complementarily to the provision of public goods at the before constitution stage.
To put it another way, they advocate some special form of earmarking. They believe that
“effectively designed earmarking may limit the extent to which government, any
government, can exploit the taxpaying public,” and “government may be given a positive
incentive to provide the goods and services that taxpayers want” (Brennan and Buchanan
1978). In so doing, the increase in the public goods provision will lead to the expansion
of tax base. They also believe that this rule is consistent with a Leviathan’s incentives
and, therefore, will be self-enforcing. The maximization of revenue could be realized
either by expanding tax revenue, or, when there is no room to expand tax revenue, simply
by keeping the expenditure as low as possible.
This rule (thereafter we call it “B-B rule”) points out the key problem in the
theory of mechanism design. For a tax structure to be “good,” it must solve government’s
incentive problems. 8 In other words, it must combine the voters’ interests together with
that of the government’s.

8

Where “good” means efficiency supporting.
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However, rule setting needs to be contingent; therefore there always exist
loopholes. Taken as a contract, a constitution by nature is incomplete and cannot exhaust
all possibilities. It would be very difficult to construct a good constitution. Meanwhile,
B-B rule suggests directly taxing public sectors, which seems a little bit implausible in
reality.
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CHAPTER II
ESSAY I TAX STRUCTURE, MORAL HAZARD
AND CHINESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIORS
The current budget system in China provides a natural experiment to examine the
Leviathan model. In this system, essentially the local government receives no pressures
from the local residents. In other words, there is no horizontal accountability for the local
officials. The local governments are at least free from the pressure of re-election, even if
it is unrealistic to say that they do not need to serve the interests of local residents. From
this perspective, we take the Chinese public finance system as a good example to study
the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. Therefore, in order to have a better idea of
how incentives can influence government behaviors, here we will focus on the behaviors
of local governments in China. There are 5 levels of governments in China: the center,
provinces, cities or prefectures, counties and townships. Each level of government plays
different roles, takes on different risks, has different degrees of fiscal discretion, and is
affected very differently by the “constitutions.” Generally speaking, each government is
responsible more directly to the next higher level of government. However, even though
the provincial government is the one that is directly accountable to the central
government, the central can intervene in local issues in county and even township level
governments. There is usually no delineated expenditure responsibilities assignment
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among levels of governments, which makes it difficult sometimes to differentiate which
level of government is responsible for what. In our notation of the general introduction to
the system in China in the following part, unless explicitly specified, when we use local
governments, we usually mean it in a general sense, which includes all sub national
levels of governments.
Tax System and Local Governments in China
It is observed that there exist some paradoxes in the behaviors of local
governments in China. Across the whole country, local governments are trying their best
to attract investors into their localities, including investing a lot on infrastructures,
granting preferential tax policies, and so on. Sometimes local governments’ efforts to
recruit enterprises are even being carried out at the costs of huge side effects, such as
serious pollutions or spreading of environmental related diseases. In rural China,
however, local governments have been investing very little on such infrastructures as
roads, wells, dams, and so on. In cities, the local governments refuse to give nonresidents
rights that are equivalent to what city dwellers are enjoying, to use public schools,
hospitals and so on, or alternatively charge them higher fees. 9 Also, in order to reduce the
public expenditures on education, local governments deregulate the operations of the
school system, allowing schools, especially top schools, to charge students elevated
9

In China, the household registration system, “hukuo,” that shows where you have legal residency and put restrictions
on cross region labor migration, is still quite strictly enforced. It came into effect in 1948, and dividing households into
rural or urban residents, with urban residents having access to foods and other facilities subsidized by the government,
also being employed by state-owned enterprises. See Roy Bahl and Jorge Martinez (2003). The local residency cannot
be changed simply by renting or even owning a place to live in a particular locality, different from what is in the United
States. It has to satisfy certain requirements, going through certain complicated official procedures and generally are
very difficult. The households are asked to prove their local urban residency before entering schools in cities and towns,
otherwise they will have to pay much higher fees than normal tuition.
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tuitions. As a consequence, schools become monopolies, with higher prices and lower
enrollments for education than before. These seemingly unrelated phenomena are,
according to our point of view, in fact implicitly connected with each other through the
local governments’ incentives of pursuing revenue. Local governments are encouraging
or making efforts in activities that will bring about more revenue, while discouraging or
compressing activities that are not contributing to revenue increase.
Some background about the Chinese budget system
Before carrying out more detailed analysis of local government behavior in China,
some background information is in order. The Communist Party of China, the ruling
party, has a strictly hierarchical structure, and generally higher-level government
determines the appointment, promotion and dismissal of lower level government officials.
Since there are no elections, there are no correlations between the stay-in-power or
promotions or dismissal of local government officials and satisfying the preference of
local residents; therefore local government officials are not accountable horizontally to
the public. Instead, local government officials are generally accountable vertically to
higher-level government, who determines their appointment and promotion. Local
government officials do not have to care about satisfying local residents’ preferences
unless upper-level government officials do. Sometimes in order to achieve their goals
they may even sacrifice local residents’ interests. As we mentioned above, they might try
to take in investors who can bring about huge environmental problems to the locality.
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It is observed that, since higher-level government plays a vital role in local
government officials’ political career, the latter will try all means to please the former.
According to Edin (2003), the principal criteria of evaluating public officials include
political integrity (de), competence (neng), diligence (qin) and achievements (ji). Among
them, achievement is the most important criterion, account for 60 to 70 percent of
evaluation of the performance. The reason is that the other three criteria are often based
on the subjective assessment of higher-level government, unlike the achievement
criterion, which is more objective and verifiable, and therefore more comparable and
more incontrovertible. This gives higher-level government greater information advantage
in evaluating officials. Under the strategy of “fa zhan shi ying dao li” (means
development is what really counts) that the communist party of China has been
advocating for the objective of catching up with developed countries, GDP maximization
has been included in the central government’s policy agenda for years. In order to
guarantee that central government has enough resource in fulfilling objectives of
macroeconomic control and economic development, revenue collected by local
governments and remitted to the central government is of vital role. That is why revenue
collected by local government is one of the most important criteria that higher-level
government uses in assessing local officials’ achievements. 10 Under this context, local
government officials’ strategy of pleasing higher-level government can be safely

10

Or, alternatively, with more revenue collection, it’s easier for local government officials to achieve objectives central
government uses to assess their performance.
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summarized in the objective of maximizing local revenue. Local government officials
would try their best to mobilize revenue from all sources, in addition to taxes, in order to
remit more tax revenue to the center on one hand, and keep more revenue in their own
discretion on the other. The retained revenue is indispensable in fulfilling their
expenditure responsibilities, which are usually the mandates of the central government.
Another part of it, maybe more important, is used to invest on items that are conducive to
tax revenue further increase so they can access more revenue in the future. From this
perspective, local officials’ revenue maximizing behavior itself is aimed at maximizing
their own personal benefits, either political benefit as stated above or monetary benefits,
since more funds at hands enable local officials to pursue “perks” more easily or simply
can bring about more cash bonus. Therefore, besides the Leviathan model, the
bureaucratic model is also likely to have some explanatory power in modeling local
government behaviors in China. That is why we are trying to construct a model,
combining the essence of Leviathan model and Bureaucratic model in the following
section.
The fiscal system in China has experienced a series of changes and reforms.
Revenue maximization has entered local government officials’ objective function ever
since the tax contracting system was founded in 1984.
Before the tax reform in 1980s, local governments at best acted as agents of the
central government, who collected revenue on behalf of the latter and handed it over to
the center. Then central government allocated the revenue according to different factors
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back to the provinces. Local governments would bargain with the center in order to get
more revenue allocated. Back then the government revenue mainly consisted of profits
from state-owned enterprises. Local governments did not have an incentive to mobilize
more revenue since all of their expenditure came from the allocation of the central
government. Greater bargaining power was more important than capability of collecting
more revenue.
The revenue contracting system, started in 1984, put an end to this situation.
Under the contracting system, based on different fiscal conditions of individual localities,
provinces were grouped into 6 types of different revenue-sharing contracts they had with
the central government, either remitting certain amount or some proportion of collected
revenue to the center and retaining the rest, taking the forms of “basic sharing,” “basic
sharing with growth,” “incremental sharing,” or “fixed quota” or “fixed quota with
growth” (Bahl 1999); or receiving certain amount of subsidies from the center (Knight
and Li 1999). For example, “basic sharing with growth” means that “revenue growth up
to a defined limit was divided between center and province according to a formula;” and
“both the limit and the sharing ratio were negotiated. The province could retain all
collections above the limit” (Bahl 1999). Since the contracts were fixed before the
revenue was collected by the local governments, local governments always tried to find
ways to keep more tax revenue collected away from the remittance to the center so as to
keep more as their retained revenue. One important choice was to channel revenue into
extra-budgetary revenue or even off-budgetary revenue, a subject to which we will return
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later. Another choice was to grant preferable tax rates or tax breaks to local enterprises, in
exchange for more non-tax revenue, which were in the local governments’ interests but
impairing the central government’s interests. Meanwhile, the central government, after
the provinces had collected the revenue, often reneged on its promise and asked for more
than what stated in the contracts from the provinces (Ma 1995; Ma and Norregaard 1998).
Therefore the relation between the center and the local governments was pretty much ad
hoc and adversarial instead of following certain rules and being cooperative. The lack of
constraints to both the central and the local governments made it difficult to quantify
intergovernmental fiscal relations in China. Since the profits from state-owned
enterprises had been gradually changed into taxes, tax revenues became the major source
of government revenue. By that time local governments already started their revenue
mobilization. But since the fiscal relations between the local and the center were
according to certain predetermined contracts, even though the contracts were not
implemented strictly, revenue collection was not so important in evaluating the
performance of local government officials. Local government officials cared more about
the retained revenue after remitting to the center, as well as extra-budgetary revenue and
off-budgetary revenue over which local governments had full discretion. This is one of
the reasons why the ratio of central government’s revenue to total revenue kept falling in
the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, the ratio of government revenue over GDP kept
diminishing, too, contrary to what “Wagner’s law” predicts. Mainly owing to the falls of
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these two ratios, new tax reform was undertaken at the end of 1993 and was implemented
beginning in 1994.
The 1994 tax reform claimed to make a fundamental departure from the old
system. 11 In 1994, taxes were divided distinctively into central taxes, local taxes and
shared taxes. There was also a significant change in tax administration: the newly
founded national tax bureau, separated from the local tax bureau. Each of these two tax
administrations is responsible for the collection of central taxes and local taxes,
respectively, with the shared taxes falling into the territory of the central tax bureau and
then shared between the central and the local governments. Simply put, one of the major
parts in shared tax is value added tax, with 75% of the tax revenue kept by the central
government and 25% allocated to the local. 12 It also includes the corporate income tax,
personal income tax and security transaction tax, and etc. VAT has been assuming more
and more a more important role in total tax revenue. In 2000, VAT, together with other
business-related taxes such as sales tax and consumption tax, took almost 80% in total
tax revenue. In 2003, the VAT alone still comprised almost 50% of the central tax
revenue and 20% of the local tax revenue with a average of 36% in total tax revenue
(China statistical yearbook 2004). Now local governments’ enthusiasm of mobilizing
revenue is more than ever before. Since economic development becomes the priority of
the central government, more local revenue means more resource in fulfilling local
11

As it turned out later, this claim hasn’t been fully justified.
The corporate income tax is shared based on the property rights of the enterprises in question, the personal income
tax is shared with 60% goes to the center and 40% goes to the local, and the security transaction tax is shared equally
between the center and the local (Liu 2004).
12
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governments’ development targets and therefore becomes very important in evaluating
local government officials’ performance. For the shared taxes, even though the share to
local governments are fixed, local governments can always get more if the total amount
of the shared revenue is higher. Besides, as we mentioned above, the VAT revenue takes a
very big share in total tax revenue. Therefore, local governments usually take great
efforts to mobilize shared revenue. Local taxes, which are completely within local
governments’ domain, apparently are also their revenue maximizing targets. With
revenue maximization as their objective, local governments’ behavior is centered on how
to mobilize more revenue, in addition to tax revenue. They will engage in activities that
are conducive to further increase revenue and discourage or even try to compress
activities that cannot bring about more revenue.
Though there have been some big changes in the Chinese tax system, the basic
incentives behind the local governments stay almost the same. The voting system still has
no role to play at all. All levels of local government officials are still appointed by their
superiors. The local officials have no incentives to satisfy the local residents, as predicted
by the median voter model. Also, as mentioned above, collecting more revenues or
constructing more factories are still important and necessary (though not sufficient)
conditions for the local officials to get promoted. In short, in the new context the local
governments are still Leviathan-like, and, for the reasons stated below, their revenues
depend on the taxes to an even greater extent.
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Local governments’ revenue maximizing behavior is not without any constraints.
Some arrangements made in 1993 by the central government, along with other
institutions that have long been effective, serve in effect as constitutional constraints that
Brennan and Buchanan proposed to local governments. Central government knows well
that, given that local residents cannot migrate freely across regions, neither can they
choose government officials through voting, local governments have a tendency to
extract too much fiscal resources from local residents. 13 Therefore the central
government imposes some constraints on local governments’ revenue mobilizing
behaviors. First, central government determines the type of taxes, and local governments
cannot levy new taxes. Second, the tax rates for all taxes are predetermined by the central
government, and local governments generally have no discretion. 14 These two constraints
applied to central taxes, shared taxes, as well as local taxes. Tax revenue is determined by
tax rate and tax base. Now that the tax base is the only variable local governments can
actually adjust, local governments can only achieve tax revenue maximization by
enlarging the base of the taxes to which they are entitled. They cannot obtain higher tax
revenue by marking up tax rate. Additionally, capital in China is relatively mobile
compared with labor, especially FDI, partly owing to the still effective Household
Registration System, the so-called “hukou.” For local governments, more capital
investment means larger tax base. Local governments were able to grant preferential tax
13

To put this in the traditional term of public finance, this is to say that local residents can neither “vote with the foot”,
nor “vote with the hand.”
14
There are some exceptions, even though quite minor, such as the urban construction and maintenance tax and
property tax, somehow gives a signal that the central government is now taking more liberal route.
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rates and other tax breaks to attract foreign investors before 1994 tax reform. After 1994,
these tax concessions are not permissible any more. Local governments could also reduce
the enterprises’ financing costs by making state-owned banks loan out funds at lower
than market interest rates, the so called “policy lending.” After the financial reform in the
1990s, this kind of policy lending is no longer a policy instrument for local governments.
These changes in concert impose further constraints to local governments’ revenue
maximizing behavior. They have to find alternative ways to attract investors. Of course,
as we noted above, improving on the efficiency of tax administration, or improving on
the rate of tax collection is always a strong economic instrument that local governments
can employ. But in this paper, for the incentive problem that we are dealing with
specifically, we do not give it as much attention as it deserves.
Therefore, on the one hand, local governments encounter more contingent
constraints in raising tax revenue than before; on the other, they are taking on more
expenditure responsibilities, partly owing to the fact that there is no delineate expenditure
assignment between level of governments, which enable higher level government to shift
expenditure responsibilities down to lower level governments. Local governments are
now more attempted to engage in revenue maximizing activities. Here we should
interpret the “revenue” in a more general sense: it includes not only tax revenue that we
mainly dwelt with above, but also the revenue from other sources such as user fees and
various surcharges.
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It almost becomes a tradition in fiscal reforms in China that only the revenue side
is tackled. The latest fiscal reform in 1994 is a case in point. It reassigns revenue between
central and local governments, while no corresponding expenditure reassignments have
been made. As a consequence, the center shifts some responsibilities to the provinces,
and the provincial governments in turn shift their responsibilities down to the lower level
governments. In China, unlike most of the developed countries, expenditures on items
with huge externalities and basic human development such as education, health and even
social security are responsibilities of local government. Due to the importance of these
expenditure responsibilities, some of them are mandated by the central government,
however without corresponding revenue assignments, therefore become “unfunded
mandate.” The most important one is “the setting of wages for local civil servants by the
central authorities” (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). These mandates “provided
organizational incentives for local agencies to maximize their quest for financial
resources, as evaluation of performance of local officials created personal incentives to
raise revenues” (Bernstein and Lu 2003). Budgetary revenue apparently is not enough for
the increased expenditure responsibilities for lower level governments; therefore revenue
sources outside of budget become indispensable to local governments. Extra-budgetary
revenue and off-budgetary revenue have long been local governments’ revenue sources in
implementing their expenditure responsibilities. In some years the amount of
extra-budgetary revenue sources was even comparable to budgetary revenue. It often
happens that local government divert budgetary revenue to extra-budgetary revenue to
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avoid remitting the latter to the center and so have more discretion over it, which
contributes to the diminishing of the share of central government revenue in total revenue.
“The practice [of tapping extra budgetary funds to finance government expenditures] is
so pervasive that extra budgetary funds are commonly considered a ‘second budget,’
whose availability substantially alleviates the revenue squeeze at the local level” (Wong
1991). That made central government narrow the definition of the latter and try to
include more revenue sources into budgetary management in late 1993. However, besides
extra-budgetary revenue, off-budgetary revenue, which comes from “ad hoc charges,
unauthorized fees, forced ‘contributions,’ and the like” (Wang 1997), is completely
outside central government’s budget control. Even before the 1994 tax reform, local
governments had levied various fees and surcharges, part of which was used to make up
their expenditure shortage. Some of the extra or off-budgetary revenue are employed to
finance the local governments’ expenditure responsibilities that can not be fulfilled with
the budgetary expenditure. For example, some of the health fees were rolled out directly
to health spending. But not all of the extra-budgetary funds are used in this legitimate
way. For example, one story tells that the fees from the bureau of social planning were
used to construct the office building for the local government. 15 There was certainly a
considerable amount of this fund being used to satisfy the personal interests of local
government officials, whether to pursue the “perks” or directly as their cash bonus. In
rural areas of China, these fees and levies have long been a heavy burden for farmers and,
15

This is from the author’s own experience in Henan Province, China.
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given its nature of coercive collection and improper usage, contribute to the social
instabilities in rural China. That is why the central government has been trying to enforce
the administration of extra-budgetary revenues and reduce or eliminate illegal fees and
surcharges. However, it has not been very successful.
It should be noted that the behaviors of local governments are the responses to the
arrangements of central government. These arrangements are similar to the case of
Proposition 13 in California, in that they both put strict constraints on the revenue side at
the local level. Our conjecture is that, under these constraints, in order to maximize tax
revenue, local governments would try to enforce the tax collection as strictly as possible,
reducing the expenditure to the minimum level, and rearrange their expenditure budgets
and their compositions to attract the firms into or keep them from moving out of the
locality, with the goal of enlarging their revenue base. They would expend more on
expenditures that are conducive to more taxable activities, such as infrastructure, in order
to obtain higher revenue in the future. They encourage investment because they can
collect VAT and other business taxes from firms’ production activities. They refuse to
expend on education and health because, as they see it, they cannot derive much revenue
and so cannot benefit much from these expenditures, unless the central government
mandate otherwise. Therefore, expenditures on such basic human development as
education and health services have become relatively less important. 16 Similarly, they

16

The case for education is better since the central government mandate that local governments put priority to
education.
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refuse to treat nonresidents equally because they cannot collect income tax from them.
However, in rural areas where they can only collect head tax, which is in fact a fixed
amount for every farmer, unlike VAT and other business taxes, which are proportional to
actual productions, they can not benefit from investing on rural infrastructures; therefore
they would make as little efforts as possible in expending on local public goods in rural
China in order to reduce expenditure.
Some Important Facts about the Tax System in China Need to Be Stressed
The current tax system in China has been examined intensively since it was
established in 1994. For example, Bahl (1999) discussed the whole system and paid
special attention to the effects of tax reform on the fiscal relationship between central
government and local governments, the tax administration etc. A series of World Bank
reports were also published, such as the one in 2002, which analyzes the current
inter-governmental fiscal relations, pointing out the problems in revenue and expenditure
assignments, and proposing ways to fix these problems. Bahl and Martinez (2003)
examined the role that fiscal federalism plays in the context of economic growth,
modernization and globalization and various aspects of economic reform in China. Xu
(1995) summarized the backgrounds of tax reform, and introduced the process of fiscal
reform in detail. Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang (2002) examined the evolution of the
fiscal transfer system and pointed out the existing problems. Huang (1995) and Wong
(1991) studied the relationship between the central and the local, with special attention to
the strategic behaviors of local government.
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Among various aspects of tax system in China, there are some important facts
that need special attention.
First, even though widely considered to be a decentralized fiscal system (Qian
and Weingast 1996; World Bank 2002), at least from the fact that the expenditures by
subnational government make about 70 percent of government budgetary expenditures
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003), the tax system in China strikingly demonstrates that
it is the central government itself that is in charge of the tax base and tax rates. This is
totally different from a federal fiscal system. 17
In China, the centrally determined tax structure and tax rates are applied to all
local governments without considering the characteristics of individual localities.
Uniform is by no means an efficient arrangement in China because China is such a big
and diversified country; geographically, democratically and economically.
Second, the current tax system has been useful in dealing with the specific
problems facing the central government at the time when it was designed and
implemented. For example, in 1993 the Chinese economy was under heavy pressure
from inflation. The consumption based VAT was designed to counteract the firms’
investment enthusiasm because the inflation was believed to result from firms’ over
investment (Xu 1995). 18

17

As an example of federal fiscal system, the states in the United States surely have the power to choose tax bases and
rates in their jurisdictions.
18
The VAT can be classified into consumption-type VAT and income-type (which further classified into gross
income-type and net income-type) VAT according to the different treatment to investment assets. The
consumption-type VAT excludes investment and therefore includes only consumption, in effect a kind of sales tax. See
Rosen (Rosen 1999).
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Meanwhile, the designers of the tax system believed in their capability of making
the local officials do what the central government desired, and often ignored the
significant role that incentives can play in shaping local government behaviors. As
mentioned above, even under the pressure of re-election, the governments in western
countries still adopt strategic behaviors. When there is no election pressure, the
enthusiasms of taking on strategic behaviors would be even greater. The Chinese local
governments not only lack horizontal accountability, but are also subject to little
monitoring from the higher level government because of generally high monitoring costs.
They would not follow what the higher level government expects them to do if the
incentives from the tax structure are incompatible with their interests. For example, in
September 1993, when the contracting system was still under way, in order to guarantee
the launching of the new tax sharing reform and mitigate the resistance from provincial
governments, the central government adopted a major concession towards provincial
governments. That is, based on the hold-harmless principle, the center promised to give
tax rebates back to the provinces, and “guarantee that the level of each province’s
revenue after 1993 would not be lower than that in 1993” (Wang 1997). In order to do
that, the policy makers needed to determine the base year, based on the revenue in which
the central government can determine the amount of tax rebate from central to each
province according to some formula (Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang 2002; Wang 1997;
Wong 2000). Since higher base year revenue will lead to a higher rebate in the future, the
provincial governments would have incentives to manipulate the tax revenues in the base
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year in order to get higher rebate in the future. The central government finally announced
1993 to be the base year in September, 1993. As a result, from September till the end of
1993, the tax revenues collected by all provinces increased dramatically. For example,
compared with the year before, in September alone the revenue increased by 60%; in
October and November, the increases were 80% and 90% respectively. In December, the
figure was doubled and reached 120% (Zhao 2003). The strategic responses from
provincial governments load heavy burden on the central government in the process of
implementing tax rebate policy in 1994 tax reform.
Third, there exist risk issues in the current tax system. Because the local tax base
is fluctuating, the local governments have incentives to stabilize their budget revenues.
One way to stabilize the budget is to shift expenditure responsibilities to the residents
and make the residents pay for the provision of public goods and services by themselves
when a financial crisis occurs. Sometimes, the shift of expenditure responsibilities may
not only result in the under-provision of public goods and services in the locality, but also
put local residents into difficulties. The reduction in services obviously violates the
regulations issued by the center, and the invasion into local residents’ lives goes further
against the central government’s endeavor. If the bitterness from the suffering local
residents can catch the center’s attention, the center may take some economic or even
political actions to discipline the misbehaving local government. Punishment in this form,
however, rarely happens since voices from the grassroots can seldom reach the center.
Consequently, local government’s conduct of fulfilling the expenditure assignments by
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invading local residents’ lives happens quite often, not only in the educational sector, but
also in other basic service sectors such as agriculture supporting funds.
Even in the case that the fluctuation is not a serious problem, the total revenues
within local governments’ discretion are limited. Regulations issued by the central might
impose risks on local revenues in the sense that the constitutionally imposed expenditure
responsibilities leaves local governments with less discretion over the remaining revenue,
thus is equivalent to a reduction in local revenues. For instance, if the central issues an
order to guarantee the teachers’ salaries, expenditures on other public services have to be
reduced or even revoked. For example, in Xiangfan, Hubei Province, the payment arrears
are transferred from education sector to government departments. A lot of government
employees, even those in the Revenue Department of Xiangfan Prefecture, cannot get
paid on time (Lu 2004). Besides taking the form of payment arrears, local governments
could also reduce or stop expending on local infrastructures, and so on, which would
result in more serious consequences of underprovision of public goods and services. It is
reported that local governments deregulate those local key schools, and let them behave
like a monopoly and charge high tuitions. In doing so, local governments shake off part
of the expenditure responsibilities on education. But the consequence is higher tuitions
and lower enrollments, which is obviously an inefficient outcome and also not in the
local residents’ interests. 19 It is also acknowledged that in order to shift the risks in the
revenues, local governments charge higher user fees for the public utilities they own.
19

The case in Jianli County, Hebei Province that we mentioned earlier provides us an example. Also another example
is from the author’s fieldwork done in the Henan Province, China, in 1998.
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These examples show that the local governments can shift some of the risks in
their revenues to the residents or other economic agents within their jurisdictions. That is
why risk issues should be considered explicitly in the current tax system. Besides direct
regulations, two methods can be followed to help the local government to deal with the
risks. The first one can be done through a transfer system managed by the center.
Obviously the revenue accrued to the center is more stable than those of the locals
because the center collects revenues from the whole country and has a more diversified
tax base. The transfer fund can be delivered from the center to different provinces
according to different formulas and from provinces to city or prefecture and county
governments following some different arrangements (Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang
2002). However, since the formulas highly depend on the provincial governments’
capabilities of negotiating with the center, the provinces that need support most are
generally those that are poor and have weak bargaining power. Therefore usually the
poor provinces are not necessarily able to obtain the support they need through the
transferring system. Same phenomena are also observed when the transfers are allocated
by the provincial governments to lower level governments.
Alternatively, assigning a more stable tax base to the local government can reduce
the risks. Property tax, imposed more on relatively immobile properties and therefore
provides government relatively stable revenue sources, is widely used as the tax base for
local governments in developed countries. In contrast, the VATs and the agriculture tax
that are widely used as major revenue sources for provincial and county governments in
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China, fluctuate with the economic conditions and natural conditions respectively, and
thus involve risks and can not guarantee to provide stable revenue. Before the adoption
of property tax as major local government revenue source, what should be done is to
stabilize the current tax base in order to reduce the risks involved.
Since infrastructures play a vital role in mitigating volatility of weather and
stabilizing agriculture production, the problem of fluctuations is more serious in areas
where infrastructures themselves or their maintenance are in great need. However, due to
the nature of the head tax in current rural China, the necessity of stabilizing the tax base
is not so urgent, which partly explains why county and township governments, whose
major revenue source is agriculture tax, have no incentive to invest in infrastructure.
Nonetheless, too much variation is by no means a good thing, thus reducing the
variability of tax base should be within every level of governments’ policy agenda.
Fourth, the public goods that we are considering here are generally not merely
consumption goods, but more importantly, are inputs for production, such as irrigation
facilities including reservoirs, dams, and transportation system including roads, bridges,
etc. Unlike other infrastructures that mostly bring benefits to households, such as parks,
health care facilities, these infrastructures are also conducive to production. In this sense,
the government behaviors of public goods provision are closely related to economic
growth. That is one of the reasons that it is of great importance to examine the role of
government in public goods provision in the context of economic growth of China.
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From the above analysis we can see, the current tax system in China suffers from
a series of incentive and risk-sharing problems. These problems make the system less
efficient than it could be. 20 If we consider this “constitution” a contract between the
central and the local, just like contracts binding a landlord and a farmer, these problems
can be easily discerned. And it will not be too difficult to remedy these flaws. Keeping
this in mind, we are trying to apply the principal-agent model and suggest some
mechanism to correct the inefficiencies in the current system.
In order to evaluate alternative systems, it is necessary to undertake positive
analysis of how the current system works. Here we take rural China as an example,
investigating how the current agriculture tax system works inefficiently and suggesting
ways of correcting for it. The reason for choosing to carry out only theoretical analysis in
this section is due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, which makes it impossible
to perform empirical analysis. In addition, the relative simplicity of the agriculture tax in
China makes it easier to model the relationship between central government and the local
governments. Here we need to specify local governments as county and township
governments, for whom agriculture tax comprises one of the most significant revenue
sources. More importantly, the agricultural sector in China is the most fundamental
economic sector. The majority population in China, the country with the biggest
population in the world, consists of farmers, who are generally low income earners, and
the task of getting the farmers ends is by itself formidable. According to the Chinese
20

For this perspective, Gordon and Li (1997) follow the same logic as Wong.
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yearbook, in 2001, among the almost 1.3 billion population in China, the rural population
took up almost 770 million, a share of about 60%. Following the process of urbanization,
this share has been declining from over 80% in late 1970s, but still takes up a bigger
share than the urban population. The county and township governments take on a more
active role in rural China, which makes it a better object in studying government
behaviors.
Agriculture Production and Local Government Behaviors
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors in the Chinese economy, though
it is not contributing the most to total GDP. Most of the rural residents are making their
living by conducting agricultural activities related to land. This suggests that land is the
main financial resource for most of the farmers. What is more, for some of the farmers,
the land may be the only chance by which they can make their families’ ends met. Even
for those new immigrants from countryside to urban areas, the land is of high importance,
since most of them take only seasonal jobs in urban areas. What they earn are just
top-ups to their agriculture earnings. In addition, their jobs are full of uncertainty.
Therefore, the agricultural activity is still the center of the family issues and agriculture
production levels are very important for the farmers.
The Chinese rural economy is different from the agriculture industries in the
western countries, since the latter are in general intensively capitalized. The agriculture
sector in China is characterized by three stylized facts. First, the majority of farmers in
China can only conduct agriculture activities on very small pieces of land, located
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diversely around the village they live. 21 The average land each farmer is entitled to
operate in a county in Hebei province is only 0.07 hectares (Xiang and Huang 2003). 22
Second, the majority of lands are located in areas very sensitive to the changes in
the weather and other natural conditions. Because the irrigation facilities are not
generally available, for some batch of land, the production has to rely mostly on the
natural precipitation. According to Xiang and Huang (2003), in Hebei province, the mean
value of areas could be covered by the irrigation facilities is only 65% with a range from
13% to 95%. Also, in the same province, the surface water resource is only 10% of the
national average and 70% of irrigation depends on underground water source, which
cannot be easily accessed without considerable investment on irrigation facilities (Xiang
and Huang 2003). The water supply in per capita terms in China is less than one quarter
of the world average, which makes it imperative to construct infrastructures for water
such as dams and wells, etc in the rural areas and develop water-using efficiencies
(Project of China's Agenda 21). Empirical studies illustrate that the infrastructure is
helpful for the improvement of agriculture productivity. For example, even in Jiangsu
Province, one of the provinces endowed with the most desirable climate for agriculture
activities, evidence shows that investment on infrastructure is very helpful and very
important to the increase in agriculture production (Wang 2003).

21
The reason behind this arrangement is to balance the gain from risk-reduction and the loss caused by diseconomies
of scale.
22
1 hectare equals 2.471 acres, which makes the average land a farmer can operate to be 0.17 acres.
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The third fact is that, as mentioned above, the quantity of farmers in a village is
usually very large. It is well known that it is usually difficult to reach an agreement in a
big group. In this context, it would be hard to agree on the size of the public goods to be
provided in villages by negotiating among farmers in some areas. Due to the high
transaction costs involved in reaching an agreement on private provision of
infrastructures, the incremental productivity gains from investment in the infrastructures
will be reduced.
The interaction of these three factors makes it clear that, without government
intervention, the extremely high transaction costs of providing public goods privately
will become a big obstacle in making decisions on investing on infrastructures that play
such important roles in agricultural production. Lack of government intervention leaves
public facilities in rural China mostly unattended. For example, the irrigation facilities in
China have been in need of maintenance since the decentralization of the collective
economies (Cheng and Chun 2003).
From the above analysis, the government interventions on infrastructure
provision could be both beneficial and desirable. 23 The problem is how to finance the
23

In addition, the public intervention can play a significant role in the anti-poverty in the Chinese rural area. The most
part of the Chinese rural communities have been suffering from poverty for a long time. In most rural areas, the basic
income sources are still proceeds from farming activities that highly depend on the weather conditions. The
consumption risks in the rural area in developing countries such as China are notoriously related to the natural
conditions. A lot of non-market institutions have been developed to deal with the risks. Without perfect insurance
market, the households can take other actions, some time at very high costs, to avoid the risks they face. These actions
can take such forms as crop and field diversification, engagement in other non-farming activities, etc. They “might also
limit income risk by choosing a diverse portfolio of occupations, or through the strategic migration of family
members” (Alderman and Paxson 1994). In combating risks, the households can be made better off by the informal
arrangements such as state-contingent transfer, support between families members, friends, etc (Besley 1995; Morduch
1999; Morduch 1995). The various efforts taken by the households, however, may not alleviate them from poverty
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investment. Given that the local governments are of Leviathan type and that governments
play important roles in infrastructure provision in the rural areas in China, carrying out a
positive analysis of tax structures within this context can better serve our objective of
studying tax structure and government behaviors.
Some General Descriptions about Chinese Agriculture Tax
Before getting into insightful analysis, it is necessary to make a plain picture of
the agriculture sector in China. Unlike provincial and prefectural governments’
enthusiasm of raising revenue by expending more on such infrastructures as roads and so
on that we discussed before, county and township government officials seem to have had
little interests in local infrastructure construction in rural China. The investment related
to rural production has exhibited systematic decline, especially when there is a decline in
the revenue pool, like what happened after the fiscal reform hardened the budget
constraint for local governments. One of the case studies conducted in Shaanxi Province,
one of the poorest in China, unveiled that the pressure of fiscal self-sufficiency resulted
in the under-provision of public goods in favor of maximizing revenue instead of social
welfare. Therefore, the rural productive investment fell from 8.6% in provincial
consolidated expenditure in 1983 to as low as 1% in 1992 for one county, and a dramatic
downtrend was witnessed in another county in northern Shannxi, where the same
(World Bank 2000). The resources the households can utilize are limited. For example, though non-farming activities
are important to reduce the risks, the household may not have the necessary knowledge or lack of minimum capital to
do so (Dercon 2001). As far as the Chinese rural communities are concerned, as mentioned earlier, the poor families’
incomes are very sensitive to natural conditions and therefore involve high risks. In this context, government
intervention can be further justified by attacking poverty in rural areas.
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category of investment fell from 20% in 1980 to only 2% in 1992. Over the same period,
the share of mandatory expenditure on education and health remained stable, and the
share of wage and subsidies even increased for the first county (Park et al. 1996). As we
mentioned before, these seemingly contradictory behaviors are in effect due to the same
reason, namely, the pursuit of revenue. What is different in rural China is that it reflects
the other side of the story, where county and township government officials try to limit
activities that are not conducive to revenue increase, in order to reduce expenditure.
In China, agriculture has been contributing disproportionably more to the
industrialization ever since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. 24 Chinese
farmers, even though constituting the biggest population group in China and probably
working in the hardest conditions, have been in a disadvantageous position relative to all
other groups, mainly due to the central government policy bias towards industry. At the
beginning of the newly founded republic country, the agriculture tax was not a big
burden to the farmers. However, besides the agriculture tax, farmers usually were
required to sell grain at a price lower than market price to the state, thus paying a tax
implicitly. This compulsive grain procurement policy in the early era of PRC laid heavy
burden on farmers. Despite the subsequent economic reforms that changed the
agricultural policies now and then, and the calls for alleviating burdens for the farmers,
the changes being made had been very marginal. Not until 1979 when the Household

24

In fact, Chinese farmers have historically been subject to various taxes and charges. In some dynasties in Chinese
history, the burden to farmers was so heavy that farmers revolted against the governor.
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Responsibility System (HRS) was introduced was farmer’s situation actually improved.
The slogan for the HRS was that after meeting the requirements of state government and
collective units, the remaining part of the grain production is left to the farmers’ full
discretion. This gave farmers great incentives to engage in grain production. As a
consequence, the agriculture productivity has been greatly improved, which makes it
possible that a lot of agriculture labors were liberated from the land and subsequently, the
rapid development of township and village enterprises (TVEs). 25 This, along with the
great efforts farmers put into the land due to the incentives that the new policy brings
about, results in the significant increase of farmers’ income. Not only was the farmers’
living standard greatly improved, but the development of TVEs also contributed a lot to
the high economic growth rates since late 1970s, which attracts attention from the whole
world. Since infrastructure construction is good for the development of TVEs and also
the increase of grain production, even the lowest level of government, the village had the
incentive to mobilize resource and expend on infrastructures. 26 The agriculture tax has
been stable over time and apparently not a sufficient resource for the infrastructure
investment. In consideration of this, county and township governments were “allowed”
to collect other non-tax revenue as supplementing resource, which gave rise to a variety

25

TVEs refer to the township and village enterprises. In the Law of Township and Village Enterprises, TVEs are
defined as any enterprises located in the rural area and funded by the collectively owned rural economic organizations
or rural residents to engage agriculture-related economic activities. During 1978-1994, in term of the gross value of
industrial output of TVEs, the average annual growth rate reached 22.9! And in 1994, the output took up 42% of the
whole country (Wu and Cheng 1999). They not only contributed significantly to income increase of rural households
and the economic growth in China during the past twenty years, but also provided vast employment opportunities for
rural excess labor force.
26
The village level “government” is not among the formal five-level government structure, and it is more like a
government branch that is responsible for the township level government.
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of user fees and surcharges imposed on farmers. 27 Meanwhile, without specific
expenditure assignment, the central as well as higher level governments tended to shift
expenditure responsibilities downwards, which added to the demand for revenue
resources. As time went on, local government officials’ revenue maximization behavior
began to push the situation out of control. They began to impose more and more fees and
surcharges, in the names of providing some local public goods, many of which are not
needed by farmers, but are in the interests of the local officials’ pursuing political
benefits (Zhou 2000). More importantly, especially in rural areas, these levies are usually
mandates of the county and township governments. Even though without grounds,
farmers have to try all means to pay for them, since these kinds of activities are backed
up by the cohesive power of government authorities. In the extreme cases, when the
farmers cannot hand in the taxes and levies, either due to the lower production resulting
from poor natural conditions, or due to the cash shortage resulting from serious health
problems, county and township governments would take away their production materials,
livestock, or some other consumption merchandise to serve as their payments. 28
Therefore, as far as agriculture tax is concerned, the tax proceeds to the corresponding
governments can be taken as fixed and are guaranteed. 29 County and township

27

Of course, local governments are not formally, legally allowed to do so. Central government is not so restrictive in
enforcing the regulation, which gives local governments some discretion to collect those fees and surcharges.
28
The rural residents in China are in disadvantageous in many aspects relative to urban residents; the lack of health
insurance is one of them. Therefore, if farmers encounter some major disease, they have to pay all the expenses out of
their own pockets, which either become a big burden for several years thereafter if they can borrow money to pay for
the bills, or they simply cannot afford to get treated.
29
The conducts of capturing from the farmers is actually sometimes implemented more by the village level
“government”, instead of directly by the county and township governments. However, it is with the consent or even the
pressure from the higher level governments.
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government officials had no incentive to improve infrastructures in order to improve
agriculture production, since the increase in production level will not preserve or enlarge
revenue base, different from the case for VAT.
The decline in infrastructure investment has been a relatively recent phenomenon.
Historically, in the Mao era, there was huge investment on the irrigation system in rural
areas. At that time, the government could deploy a labor force in some area without
paying much out of the budget. By improving the infrastructures that are beneficial to
agriculture production, which was under the government’s direct control, the government
could extract more food and produce resulting from the higher production level. (Lin
1988).
In the post-Mao era, however, the investment from government declined
significantly.

According to the calculation based on data from the report by the

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Statistic Yearbook of China
(China statistical yearbook 2004), the ratio of public investment over total investment in
the agriculture sector in China was 17 % in 1980. In 1997, this ratio declined to 10%
(Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2002). Huang and Roselle (2002) found that the ratio of
government agricultural expenditure over agricultural gross domestic products (AGDP)
declined from 7.6% in 1978 to 3.6% in 1985. In addition, the public expenditure on the
water system decreased significantly. For example, in the “Fifth five – year Plan” period
(1976-1980), the ratio of public expenditure on water system over total government
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expenditures was 5.7%. The same ratio in 1993 was only 2.4% (Chen and Yang 1998).
The declines of the public expenditure in rural areas have caused serious problems.
The evidence documented above is inconsistent with economics theories. In
general, public goods are normal goods in that as income level increases the demand for
public goods should increase; the public infrastructures should follow this trend.
However, we see a totally different picture here. Evidence told us that when the income
level was low, the Chinese government invested heavily on infrastructures in rural area.
It is unmistakable that Chinese economy has been growing fast for the last 20 years; and
the corresponding income effect should push up the demand for public goods. However,
the real investment in infrastructures has been declining. This mismatch between income
level and public goods provision might be explained from some special angle. From our
point of view, part of the answer maybe lies in the current agriculture tax structure in
China. Therefore, we need to take a closer look at the agriculture tax system.
The current agriculture tax in China is essentially a fixed rent. In China, the
individual farmer has become the basic tax unit ever since the decentralization of the
collectives. The amount of agriculture tax a household pays depends on the units of land
the family is entitled to operate, and is not based on the amount of agricultural products
being produced and transacted on that land. 30 In general, all people in the same village
share the land equally. The equality of land allocation means that all people have the
same taxable units. Under this arrangement, an infant and a 90-year-old have the same
30

In China, the property right of land belongs to the country. Land is allocated to farmers based on some egalitarian
rule so farmers can use the land they are entitled to.
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tax liability as a working laborer. Therefore, the agriculture tax is actually a head tax (Liu
2004). 31
More importantly, the tax for each unit of land is fixed. According to the
Regulation of Agriculture Tax Collection of PRC, the tax collected from land is based on
the average of production in a period of time. 32 This is justified in terms of savings in
transaction costs. Indeed, in such a big country the transaction cost will be extremely
high if measuring the real production of different batch of land with various outputs
throughout of the year and collecting tax accordingly. The self-finance nature of Chinese
farmers makes things even complicated. 33 In fact, even under current regulations, the
administration costs are already very high compared to the revenues that can be collected.
According to the governor of Hainan Province, Liucheng Wei, the total agriculture tax
revenue in Hainan Province in 2003 was only 50 millions Yuan. 34 The administration
cost was 20 million Yuan, which means that 40% of taxes collected went to the operation
of tax collection agencies (Zhang 2004). This is astonishing compared with statistics in
other countries. For example, the average tax administration cost in the United States was

31
According to the agricultural tax code, the agricultural tax is a proportional tax. The amount payable equals the
product of the taxable land area, the applicable average tax rate and the production per unit of land. Among these three
parts, the production per unit of land is the production based on fair land cultivation and normal natural conditions per
unit a land. It is usually some average level of production, not the actual production in a given year in a particular batch
of land. Once chosen, it will be fixed and applied to any batch of land in the village for several years. The applicable
average tax rate in each county is usually determined by the provincial government and applied to the entire population
of farmers in the county. The rate stated in the agricultural tax code is 15.5% (Liu 2004). However, it has never been
this high in implementation, and has been decreasing in recent years following the policy orientation of the central
government. In actual collection, however, since the area of land each farmer is entitled to operate is basically
equalized, the agriculture tax is the same for everyone in the village. That’s why we take it a head tax.
32
This is verified by my interview with the Head of a village in Henan Province.
33
It is well know that Chinese farmers have a tradition to support themselves mainly out of their own production.
34
To give an idea how big the figure is, the current exchange rate is 1 dollar = 8.3 RMB.
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only 1% of the tax revenue, which means for per 1000 tax dollars collected, expenditure
on tax administration was only 10 dollars. 35
Serious efficiency problems arise due to the fixed head tax. The system shifts all
risks to the farmers. Because the government is in a better position to deal with the risks
than individuals, there is inefficiency in term of risk pooling. What is more, since the rent
is fixed, any additional expenditure by government on agriculture will be irrational. Thus
the current tax system gives local governments little incentives to invest on agriculture,
except maybe, when there is a reassessment after a period of time. The efficiency
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the agriculture production highly depends on the
natural conditions, which, in turn, crucially depends on the government investment
behavior on infrastructures.
The solution to this kind of problem often lies in the rule Buchanan and Brennan
proposed, what we called the B-B rule earlier.
The B-B Rule
The most difficult problem for the Leviathan model is that it cannot be easily
tested in western economies. For example, suppose the local government allocates some
funds in constructing local roads. These roads surely bring benefits to the local voters
and the local business. For these kinds of government behaviors, however, it is difficult
to differentiate whether it is due to the pressure of re-election, or simply the consequence
of government’s revenue maximization. To solve this problem, following what Brennan
35

Please refer to footnote 4 on page 9.
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and Buchanan did in their paper, the assumption that budgetary revenue and expenditures
are determined by the median voter’s preference at postconstitutional period can be
dropped; therefore, “individual voters-taxpayers exert control over the fiscal system only
at the constitutional stage; they are essentially powerless to affect the government’s fiscal
activities in postconstitutional political settings” (Brennan and Buchanan 1978). Under
this condition, Brennan and Buchanan suggest a particular form of earmarking, so “each
expenditure is allotted a particular tax base that is highly complementary with the public
good itself” (Brennan and Buchanan 1978). Brennan and Buchanan want to use the
complementarities to constrain the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. That is
what we call the B-B rule.
B-B rule is a good starting-point to solve the incentive problem inherently related
to the behaviors of government. This rule links the interests of voters and those of the
governments. Since the voting mechanism is assumed away, the government does
something good from the perspective of voters, not because the government cares about
the voters, or has altruistic preference. Instead, the benefits that voters gain are the
by-product of government’s selfish behavior of utility maximization. For example, the
local governments may take some actions to protect the environment. This behavior is
not motivated by catering to voters’ interests, as predicted by the Median Voter
Hypothesis, but to protect the governments’ tax bases. According to the current tax
“constitution” in the United States, most of the local governments highly depend on the
property tax as their revenue sources. Since there is a negative relationship between the
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pollution level and the values of the properties, which in turn are the tax bases; protect
the environment is in fact to protect the tax base (Glaeser 1995).

Similarly, central

governments take some actions to protect environments, again, not because they care
about voters’ health; but because higher pollution level will make people unhealthy and
raise the possibility to pay higher health care bills, which in turn, will lower a
Leviathan-like government’s space to manipulate the tax revenues. This is a point that we
are going to analyze in more detail in the second essay.
The applications of B-B rule are limited, however. Some surprising outcomes
may be derived from this type of optimal design analysis. For example, levying tax on
education may be efficient. This is of course, not the case in term of normative analysis
of public finance. But for a Leviathan-like government, spending money on education is
surely not optimal because, in most countries’ tax regimes, education sector does not
produce any immediate tax revenue. 36 The government will not have incentive to
“invest” on education sector unless it is required to do so in the “constitution.” According
to B-B rule, a necessary step, however, to induce instead of force government to “invest”
on education is to grant government the power to collect taxes from education. Under
this condition, the expansion of education sector is conducive to revenue growth. The
government thus has incentives to “invest.” 37

36

That’s exactly why the situations described in page 11-12 happen.
This taxation can be justified by the following way. There may be some efficiency loss caused by taxation. The
society, however, may gain from the enlarged education production. The net effect could be positive. Of course in this
way government is acting myopically if we take into account that education can contribute to economic growth and
therefore bring about more taxes in the future. Nonetheless, it is different in China in that people cannot move across
regions freely, since regional migration is restricted in China.

37
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The above discussion shows that applying B-B rule to solve the incentive
problem does not take into consideration risk sharing, which may result in inefficiencies.
Thus it may not offer an ideal solution to solving the incentive problems behind the
behaviors of a Leviathan-like government. Keeping this in mind, we should discuss the
incentive issues in a more restrictive manner, taking into account the risk sharing in order
to get a constructive outcome.
As we noted earlier, the risk issues in the Chinese fiscal system should be given
special attention. 38 The vertically accountable political structure does give central
government the power to modify the behaviors of local government by issuing more
regulations, however at the expense of high enforcement and monitoring costs. For
instance, the salaries of teachers are now guaranteed by regulations from the central
government, as a response from the central government to the huge delays for the
payments to teachers across the whole country, which resulted in serious grievance from
teachers and even closedown of some elementary schools and middle schools. This
regulation from the central government did make a difference: in the subsequent years,
such delays never explicitly happened again.
On the other hand, however, more regulations are not necessarily a good solution.
For whatever “constitution,” since it is impractical to exhaust all the possibilities, the
governments will always have opportunistic behaviors, let alone the enforcement and
monitoring costs involved. It is possible to regulate the payment schedule of teachers’
38

We analyzed the risk issue in more detail in previous part. Please refer to page 36.
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salaries in a “constitution,” but it will be difficult to monitor the behaviors of local key
schools that charge student high tuitions. These strategic behaviors taken on by the local
governments, as we analyzed earlier, are most likely to benefit the governments
themselves, and hurt the residents in their jurisdictions. So it is necessary to consider the
risks related to the revenues of local government in a “constitution” in order for the local
government to behave desirably. Therefore, the principal-agent model which deals with
both incentive and risk sharing should provide us a good choice.
In a principal-agent model, there are two parties; one is the so-called agent, and
the other is the so-called principal. This framework has numerous applications. In general,
it can be used to analyze any situations in which one party’s behaviors can affect the
others. The agent is assumed to have some informational advantages compared to the
principal. For example, in a firm, the employees’ efforts can affect the productivity and in
turn affect the interests of the owner of the firm. The owner cannot observe the effort
levels exerted by the employees, and can only observe the resulting production level.
Meanwhile, the production level is often assumed to be affected by some random
variables neither observable nor controllable, which makes it impossible for the owner to
infer the employees’ effort levels based on the production level. Therefore the
principal-agent model usually tries to construct some payment schedule in order to
induce the employees to exert higher effort levels, under which the possibility of
achieving better production is higher. If the employees are paid at a fixed wage, they may
not have incentives to work hard. On the other hand, as far as risk sharing is concerned, it

56

may be efficient to offer workers fixed wages, since compared with the individual
employees, the firm is in a better position than the individual employees to deal with
risks. So there is a potential conflict between the risk sharing and incentives (Holmstrom
1979; Pauly 1974; Ross 1973; Shavell 1979).
Essentially, the key issue in the relationship between the government and voters is
that voters cannot observe the government’s behaviors directly, or cannot control the
behaviors at the after-constitutional stage. For the Leviathan-like governments, if we do
not give them incentives to do what we expect them to do, as B-B rule discussed, they
will spend a minimum on what they are supposed to do at the after-constitutional stage.
That is why the optimal constitution design can be better discussed in a principal-agent
model, in addition to the earmarking as suggested by B-B rule.
We are going to extend B-B rule in the following ways. We first keep the
assumption behind the B-B rule that a voting system does not take effect in the post
constitution stage. That is why we take China, where no election exists, as an ideal case
to analyze the behaviors of a Leviathan-like government. Second, we incorporate
production function into the initial framework. We want to achieve efficiency gain in
production by showing how government behaviors affect the production, and in turn
affect economic growth. While the B-B rule does not consider the risk-sharing issue
explicitly, we will analyze the interaction between the incentives and risk sharing in a
principal-agent framework.
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The Model
In this section, a very simple model will be developed to show how the current
tax structure works inefficiently. In a later section, we will try to design a very simple
mechanism to achieve more efficient outcomes.
In the current Chinese agriculture tax system, we assume that, first, the local
governments are Leviathan-like governments. For the purpose of dealing with
agricultural tax in our model, we are going to deal more with county and township
governments here. For ease of notation, we will label them local government. As we
discussed earlier, even under election pressure, governments may have strategic
behaviors. Without elections, the government is most likely to behave like a Leviathan.
The Chinese local governments do not care or care less about the interests of local
residents because there is no horizontal accountability. The only constraints are from
regulations issued by the central. 39 To be consistent, we call the regulations
“constitution.” The central government is assumed not to be able to control the local
governments once the “constitution” (regulation) is issued because of the asymmetric
information problem.
Second, we assume that the central government cares about the interests of
farmers. The role of central government is analogous to that of the legislature in the
western countries. To some extent, it seems reasonable to make this assumption.
39
There are at least provincial governments and prefecture governments between the central government and the local
governments that we use here. However, the two levels of government either collaborate with the lower level
government in the collection of agriculture tax, or take the stand of the central. Therefore we assume them away in the
construction of our model. Even though it will lose certain merits because of this simplification, we believe that it
won’t affect the essence of the problem we are going to deal with in this section.
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Compared with the local governments, the central government does care more about
farmers. At least the central takes a neutral stance and is trusted by the farmers. One of
the explanations is that the central government wants to keep the regime stable. Also, the
central government may want to keep some balance between local officials and the
residents. Actually, dealing with the dishonest, or, in some context, even illegal, conducts
of the local governments is one of the most important tasks for the central government
and entails a lot of resources. If sometimes the local governments’ bad behaviors are
pervasive across the country and serious in consequences, the central may enact new
regulations, orders and documents, etc., to solve the problems. During years when the
local governments go beyond limits in abusing their authority and taxing farmers
excessively in the rural areas, a lot of farmers go to the central government agencies and
petition for the problem to be solved. For example, in 1990s, the local governments in
Anhui Province levied excessive taxes on the farmers, which broke the guideline issued
by the central and put many farmers in misery. The farmers tried to repeal the excess
taxes by writing to the central government, or visiting the State Council in person.
Almost every time, the central government took some actions to discipline the local
governments and alleviate the burdens to the farmers (Cheng and Chun 2003).
Third, we assume the central is in a better position to deal with the risk issues.
This assumption is reasonable. China is a big country with a fairly diversified geographic
and demographic pattern across the whole country. Since the local governments can only
collect taxes from their individual jurisdictions, the taxe bases in a specific region are
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more likely to suffer from some idiosyncratic risks. The central, however, can collect
taxes from the whole country; therefore, its tax bases may be less likely to suffer from
those risks. It is fair to say that the revenue of the central is less risky than those of any
single local governments. From this aspect, we can assume that the central government is
less risk averse than the local governments.
Fourth, we assume that the public sector has a key role to play in the agriculture
production. First, evidence shows that, even in the most fertile regions, such as Jiangsu
Province and Zhejiang Province, the infrastructures still play an important role in the
agriculture production. 40 In this context, reaching an agreement on constructing some
infrastructures is surely Pareto improvement. This agreement, however, cannot be
achieved easily. The potential transaction costs to reach an agreement among a big group
of farmers are high. One better option is to induce the government to play some role. The
efficiency can be achieved by allowing government to levy tax in exchange for supplying
some public goods.
In our model, we assume the central government will act completely on behalf of
farmers. 41 The term “farmers” and the “central government” will be used interchangeably.
Following the classic principal-agent model, the farmers, taken as a group, also
represented by the central government, can be modeled as the principal (Holmstrom

40

For details, please refer to previous section, page 42.
There are some points related to this assumption that need to be clarified. The individual farmer may be even more
risk averse than the local government. Imagine however, within such a context, the central government can allocate
some subsidies to the farmers, and can thus share the farmers’ risks. Besides, the infrastructure is shared among many
farmers, such that as a group, the farmers can pool some risks. The local government, however, cannot shift out risks
and therefore is more risk averse in this sense.
41
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1979). 42 The farmers’ production depends on the public goods supplied by the local
government and a random variable including weather and other natural factors that
cannot be controlled by human behaviors. 43 For example, the dams may not be useful if
the weather is good; the pest-control makes no contributions to the production in a year
when there are no pests. However, the dams will have a key impact on the production
level if there is a draught or a flood, and the farmers will need the pest-control badly in a
year when the pests become a serious problem. The production level would be extremely
low without the dams or the measures taken by the governments to control pests.
Since the public goods supplied by the local governments will directly affect the
production levels, and these kinds of behaviors by local governments are not observed
directly by the central governments, we are going to model the local government as an
agent whose behaviors affect the interests of the principal, the farmers. Even though the
farmers can observe the level of efforts by the local governments in providing public
goods, it is very difficult for the farmers to deliver the information to the central
government. Besides, there exist some factors that are not observable or not verifiable by
the farmers, which are captured by the random variable that we mentioned earlier.
Therefore, the central government, as the principal, cannot easily discern whether the
lower production level is due to the delinquency of local governments, the agent, or bad
natural conditions. Plus everything is locked into the “constitution” at the start.

42
43

Our model is essentially an application of those models in Holmstrom (1979).
Originally we included the labor as an input, but the labor doesn’t play any role in this model, so we took it out.
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Assume the farmer’s production function is: x = x( a, Θ) , where x is the
production level for a given batch of land, a represents the level of public good
provided by local government, Θ is the random variable capturing weather and other
natural factors that we discussed above. 44
Imagine there is a governor newly appointed by the central government. When he
takes the office, there are some revenues collected from last year’s economic activities.
These revenues can be used to compensate for the costs in the public sectors such as
educations, fire stations, outlays, dams and so on. Following our discussion earlier, we
assume that he is a Leviathan-type official. Also, we assume that in his jurisdiction, there
are only two economic sectors, one is agriculture, and the other is non-agriculture. The
governor cannot make any decisions on the legal coverage of the tax bases and tax rates.
The central government, however, cannot control perfectly the governor’s expenditure
behaviors. In other words, even if the central government can issue mandate on how
much the governor should allocate to education, health system, and etc., the actual
allocations of funds are highly dependent on the local governor’s incentives, due to the
high monitoring cost.
We assume that the local government has the following revenue
function: U (t , a ) = v (t ( x )) − c(a ) . It takes this additive form, in order to illustrate
conveniently the fact that the local government derives utility from the tax revenue while

44

Or, alternatively,

a can be interpreted as the level of public goods provided, under good governance.
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incurs disutility from providing pubic goods. 45 We assume that v (t ( x )) is strictly
concave in t (x) , in order to capture that the local government is strictly risk-averse,
compared with the central government, which is assumed to be risk neutral for simplicity.
In the revenue function, t (x) is the tax revenue collected from agriculture sector when
the production is x , and c (a ) is the cost of providing local infrastructures under effort

a , such as on irrigation system, roads, dams, wells and so on.
To capture the effects of the moral hazard problem, we need to specify the model
in more details. The agent, the local governor, can choose from two effort levels of

{

}

providing public goods, a ∈ a h , a l , where a h and a l represent the high and low effort
level respectively. For the agent, the cost for low-level effort is c (a l ) ; the cost for high
level is c(a h ) . We assume that c (a ) is an increasing function of a , so we have
c(a h ) > c(a l ) .
To capture the relationship between the production level and the public goods
supplied by the local governments, we need to assume that x is F.S.D. of a. 46 This
assumption states that a higher a will increase the possibility of obtaining higher
production, while at a higher cost, though.
To capture the effects of the random variable on the production level, we need to
assume that the output is determined stochastically. The output variable x can only take

45
Or, to put in another way, spending on public infrastructures that are not conducive to the tax revenue increase is
actually a subtraction from the utility resulted from the higher fiscal resource at discretion, therefore is not in the
interests of the local officials. In this sense, we have this disutility term here.
46
x is first order stochastic dominance of a, meaning that other things equal, with higher effort level, the probability of
achieving higher production level is higher than with lower effort level.
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two discrete values, namely ~
x ∈ x h , x l . What is more, to model the random feature of
this problem, we further assume that, there is a possibility that the two levels of
government efforts can lead to the same level of output.
Because the effort chosen by the agent cannot be observed directly by the
principal, it is impossible to levy the tax according to the effort level a .
In this context, if the agent’s effort level is a h , then there is a higher probability
to reach the higher production level x h . We assume with a h , the possibility to get x h is

p1 . Meanwhile, a higher-level effort a h cannot guarantee the achievement of x h for
sure because the production level is determined stochastically. Still we have some
possibilities to reach x l . In this case, we assume the probability of getting x l under
a h is (1 − p1 ) .

In this model, a lower-level effort a l supplied by the local government does not
mean a lower-level production x l with certainty, either. It might be due to
extraordinarily favorable natural conditions. Because of this possibility, with lower-level
effort of supplying public goods, the farmers still can obtain good harvests. Of course,
the chance of getting x h with a l is lower than that with a h . If the agent’s effort level
is a l , we assume that the probability we get x h is p 2 , the probability we get x l is

(1 − p 2 ) . Apparently, we have p1 > p 2 hold. Then we have the following figure.

Figure I Probabilities of High and Low Efforts
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X = xh

X = xl

Total Prob.

a = ah

p1

(1 − p1 )

1

a = al

p2

(1 − p2 )

1

We know that the farmer and the central government always prefer higher-level
output, and with higher effort level it is more likely to reach higher production level,
therefore, the central government will try to induce local government to provide a h . To
do so, the only way for the central government is to design a “constitution” at the
before-constitution stage. At the after-constitution stage, the central does not have
effective means to control the local government. The “constitution” may work by
assigning possibly different taxes for different levels of output. The link between
agriculture production level and government’s revenue may give local government some
incentives to exert higher-level effort.
To make the problem easier, we define t ( x h ) as the tax collected when output is
high, and t ( x l ) as the tax collected when output is low. We assume that, if the central
government does not allow the local government to levy tax on farmers, the government
will not have incentive to supply public goods. The governor will “invest” on the
nonagricultural sector. By doing so, they can collect some fixed amount of taxes, which
is the reservation revenue, m .
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Also, we define the following time path. First, the central government issues the

{

}

“constitution,” which can be a tax law or regulation such as t ( x h ), t ( x l ) . Second, local
government may accept or reject the regulation. 47 Thirdly, the local official provides
certain level of effort. Fourthly, the random output x is produced. Finally, by law or
regulation, the tax will be collected. 48
Based on the classic model of moral hazard, we have the following program. First,
the agent’s individual rationality should be satisfied. The agent should earn at least higher
than his reservation revenue, m . Second, the agent’s incentive compatibility should be
satisfied, which means that he has the incentives to offer higher effort. In other words, his
utility of exerting higher-level effort a h will be at least as high as the utility of exerting
lower-level effort a l .
The local governor’s expected utility from exerting higher-level effort a h is:

p1u (t ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )u (t ( x l )) , or p1v(t ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )v(t ( x l )) − c(a h ) .
The expected tax revenue from a l is: p 2 u (t ( x h )) + (1 − p 2 )u (t ( x l )) ,
or p 2 v(t ( x h )) + (1 − p2 )v(t ( x l )) − c(a l ) .
So the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for obtaining higher effort is the following:

p1 v ( t ( x h )) + (1 − p 1 ) v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a h ) ≥ p 2 v ( t ( x h )) + (1 − p 2 ) v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a l )
The individual rationality constraint (IR) for obtaining high effort is the following:

47

For example, the local governor can choose to meet only the minimum requirements.
As we noted earlier, the rate of tax collection is an instrument within the local government’s full control and can be
employed to increase tax revenue. Here for our question in hand, we leave this issue out for simplicity.
48

(1)
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p 1 v ( t ( x h )) + (1 − p 1 ) v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a h ) ≥ m
Constraint (1) says that for the agent, the incentive should be compatible, which means
that the expected utility from high effort should exceed the expected utility from low
effort. Constraint (2) says that, the “constitution” offered should be attractive to the agent.
If both (1) and (2) are satisfied, a constitution is said to be incentive feasible.
This is a typical two-stage model. At the first stage, the central makes an offer. At
the second stage, for any given offer, the local governor takes actions to maximize his
revenue. In general, we can use backwards induction to solve this program. The solution
to this program is a sub-game perfect outcome. We first solve the local governor’s
maximization problem at the second stage. Then we go back to solve the central
government’s problem given local governor’s optimal solution, assuming the central
government can solve the agent’s problem as well as the agent can do it by himself.
Benchmark
To make a clear comparison between the different outcomes from different
“constitutions,” we need a benchmark model. In this case, we make a strong assumption
that the central government is capable of observing the local government’s behaviors
completely. In the current Chinese political system, there is only vertical accountability.
Therefore, if the central government has full information on local governments’
behaviors, the latter would be required to take whatever actions to maximize the
agriculture production, which is in the central government’s interests.

(2)
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Let us follow the traditional methods to reach the backwards induction outcome.
First, at the second stage, the agent makes decisions. In this special case, the agent cannot
make decision according to his own interests because the central can force him to do
what the central think necessary. Therefore, we do not need to consider the incentive
compatibility. All we need to do is to keep the local government to invest on the rural
agriculture sector, i.e., satisfy the rationality constraint. Thus, at the second stage, the
local government will exert high or low-level effort, depending on the interests of the
central government.
We turn next to the central government at stage one. Given the local
governments’ response, the central government is going to solve the following revenue
maximization problem

max
h
l

{t

,t

},

w =

p

(x

h

− t(x

h

)) + ( 1 − p

)( x

l

− t ( x l ))

This revenue function is essentially the expectation of revenue under high effort
level and low effort level with different probabilities. Since in both cases, the local
government collects a tax from the output resulting from different effort level, the
revenue in each case is obtained by subtracting the relevant taxes accrued to the local
government from the respective outputs.
The revenue maximization is subject to the response of the local government at
the second stage, which is pv ( t ( x )) + (1 − p ) v ( t ( x )) − c ( a ) ≥ m
h

The Lagrange is

l
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L = p ( x h − t ( x h )) + (1 − p )( x l − t ( x l )) + λ [ pv (t ( x h )) + (1 − p ) v (t ( x l )) − c ( a ) − m
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the following:

− p + λ p v ' ( t ( x h )) ≤ 0 , = 0

if

t(xh ) > 0

(3)

− (1 − p ) + λ (1 − p ) v ' ( t ( x l )) ≤ 0 , = 0

if

t(xl ) > 0

pv (t ( x h )) + (1 − p ) v (t ( x l )) − c ( a ) − m ≥ 0

=0

if

(4)

λ >0

From (3) and (4), we can get the first-best solution. First, λ , t ( x h ) and t ( x l )
are positive. Then we have the constraints are binding. So we have

1
1
=
= λ , and so v' (t(xh )) = v' (t(xl )) . Together with the condition that
h
l
v' (t(x )) v' (t(x ))
*
h
l
the agent is strictly risk averse, we have t = t ( x ) = t ( x ) . The risk neutral principal

offers full insurance to the risk averse agent. Also t * is independent of the state of
nature.
Since only the individual rationality matters, we substitute the solution

t * = t ( x h ) = t ( xl ) into local governor’s rationality equation. When t * = t ( x h ) , from
the binding constraint for higher effort, we can get for local government,
p1 v ( t ( x h )) + (1 − p1 ) v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a h ) = m
So we have v ( t ( x h )) = m + c ( a h ) .
Therefore the local government’s optimal tax revenue under higher effort:

u * ( high ) = v ( t ( x h )) − c ( a h ) = m + c ( a h ) − c ( a h ) = m

(5) .

With a higher effort of providing public goods, the agriculture production x could
be x h with a possibility p1 . And, with the possibility (1 − p1 ) , the production level

]
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h
−1
h
could be x l . In both cases, the farmer should be paying a tax t ( x ) = v (m + c(a )) .

So the farmer (or the central government)’s net revenue is determined by the following
equation:

w * ( high ) = p 1 ( x h − t ( x h )) + (1 − p 1 )( x l − t ( x h ))
Or w * ( high ) = p 1 x h + (1 − p 1 ) x l − v − 1 ( m + c ( a h ))
On the other hand, when

(6 ) .

t * = t ( xl ) , from the binding constraint for lower effort,

we can get for local government,

p 2 v ( t ( x h )) + (1 − p 2 ) v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a l ) = m , which means
v(t ( x l )) = m + c(a l ) . So the local government’s optimal revenue under lower effort is

u * ( low ) = v ( t ( x l )) − c ( a l ) = m + c ( a l ) − c ( a l ) = m

(7 )

With a lower effort of providing public goods, the random agriculture production
x could be x h with a possibility p2 , and also could be x l with the possibility (1 − p2 ) .
−1

In both cases, the farmer should be paying a tax t ( x ) = v ( m + c ( a )) . So the
l

l

farmer’s net revenue is determined by the following equation:

w * ( low ) = p 2 ( x h − t ( x l )) + (1 − p 2 )( x l − t ( x l ))
Or

w * ( low ) = p 2 x h + (1 − p 2 ) x l − v − 1 ( m + c ( a l ))

(8 ) .

Because in the benchmark solution, we assume that the central government can
observe and control the local governor perfectly, it follows that if the value from equation
(6) is greater than that of equation (8), the central government will require the local
government to exert a h ; otherwise, a l will be the central government’s policy target.
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Therefore, the decision of inducing the agent to exert what level of efforts depends on the
values of w* (high) and w* (low) .
The principal would induce a high-level effort if and only if:

w* (high) − w* (low) ≥ 0 , which means

( p1 − p2 )( x h − xl ) ≥ v −1 (m + c(a h )) − v −1 (m + c(al ))

(9) .

In the above equation, ( x h − x l ) is the difference between high and low level of
agricultural production. ( p1 − p2 ) is the difference between the possibilities of
achieving higher level of production under different effort levels. The left hand side of
equation (9) can be interpreted as the expected efficiency gain induced by the increased
efforts. The right hand side can be interpreted as the agent’s cost in terms of the increased
disutility resulted from exerting the higher level of effort than the lower level of effort.
Therefore, the central government will choose to induce a higher effort if and only if the
expected gain from higher effort is greater than the cost.
Alternatively, to see it more clearly, we can rewrite equation (9) as the following

p1 ( x h − xl ) − v −1 (m + c(a h )) ≥ p2 ( x h − xl ) − v −1 (m + c(a l ))

(10) .

The left hand side of equation (10) is the net benefit from the higher effort, and
the right hand side is the net benefit from the lower effort. The higher-level of effort will
be chosen if and only if the net benefit from the former is greater than that of from the
latter. From the society’s perspective, in equilibrium, the marginal benefits from higher
effort and lower effort should be equal.
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When (9) or (10) holds, the local government will be required to exert a h and
thereby collect t ( x h ) = v −1 (m + c(a h )) . In this case, the farmer’s profit is determined by
equation (6), and the local government’s net revenue is governed by equation (5).
Alternatively, if equations (9) and (10) do not hold, the local government will be
−1

required to exert a l and collect t (x ) = v (m + c(a )) . In this case, the farmer’s profit
l

l

is determined by equation (8), and the local government’s net revenue is governed by
equation (7).
This analysis shows that the local government receives fixed tax revenue because
equation (5) and (7) have the same outcome, m . The farmer, or the central
government’s net profit, however, are different. Also, we cannot determine which one is
bigger.
To summarize, we have the following proposition.
Proposition I: if the behaviors of local government can be observed completely by

{

}

the central government, an optimal “constitution” t ( x i ), a i , where i = h, l , is that:
(i), the risk neutral central government offers the risk averse local government
full insurance. The local government’s tax revenue is independent of local governor’s
efforts of providing public goods, and therefore is risk free. (ii), since the central
government have perfect information and also can perfectly control local government’s
effort level, the local government’s efforts are determined by the farmer’s production
function and risk distribution. These come to mean that the local government will exert a

72

first-best level of effort. (iii), the farmer takes all risks. 49 (iv), the outcome is socially
efficient in term of first-best.
Some remarks about Proposition I
l
The choice of optimal effort t * between t ( x h ) and t ( x ) will depend on the

nature of the production function and the process of public goods provision. For example,
if the public goods are very conducive to the agriculture production, the provision of
public good would significantly increase the possibility of x to achieve higher level. Then,
a higher-level effort would be induced. This case could happen in areas where farmers
have high demands on public goods. On the other hand, if the public goods cannot
contribute much to the agriculture production, a lower-level effort would be optimal from
the social perspective, since it saves on the costs. Therefore, the higher effort may not
always be efficient.
In this case with perfect information, there is no conflict between the incentives
and risk sharing. In general, incentives should be induced by a self-enforcing mechanism.
Typically, we require the incentive constraint be satisfied. Here this constraint is
unnecessary. The authorities of the central government, which can observe perfectly the
behaviors of local government and thereby control it completely, replace the
self-enforcing mechanism.
In this first-best world, the risk-sharing issue can be separated from the incentive
problem. The central government takes all risks and leaves the local government no risks.
49

The risks can be shifted to the central government by programs like price flooring.
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This allocation of risks between the two parties is optimal since the central is assumed to
be risk neutral, while the local government is assumed to be risk averse.
In addition, this constitution is socially efficient. Since we can separate the risk
from incentive issue, there are no disincentives caused by the risk sharing. Also, the
grand production frontier could be reached through this tax structure, as for any given
resources, we cannot find any other possible reallocation to further increase the
agriculture production.
The Moral Hazard Problems—Current Tax Structure and Its Outcomes
Just as mentioned above, the Chinese current tax structure in the rural area by
nature is a head tax. Every year, farmers hand in a given amount of money to the local
government as the tax. Though the central government does care about the welfare of the
farmers, the cost of monitoring local government is extremely high due to the problems
related to asymmetric information and bureaucracy. Therefore, in reality the local
government’ behaviors of providing local infrastructure cannot be monitored effectively.
The current “constitution” set up a fixed tax schedule; therefore all risks fall on
the central government. 50 There exists a serious incentive problem because the central
government cannot monitor the local government perfectly.
Under the current tax structure, the tax revenue local government can collect is
t

50

fixed

, which is independent of x and a . Because of this, for any given t fixed , it is

If the risks cannot be shifted to the central government, the farmers will have to take all risks. Unfortunately, the
latter is what usually happens in the real life.
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rational for local government to exert a low effort because it means a lower expenditure.
We can check this very easily.
The revenue from low effort is:

u fixed (low ) = v (t fixed ) − c ( a l )

(11) .

The revenue from high effort is:

u fixed ( high ) = v ( t fixed ) − c ( a h )

(12 ) .

Then we have

u fixed (low) − u fixed (high) = (v(t fixed ) − c(a l )) − (v(t fixed ) − c(a h )) = c(a h ) − c(a l ) > 0 ,
since according to our assumption, c ( a ) is increasing in a . Thus the local government
will rationally choose low level of effort. In the current “constitution,” the central
government does not provide local government incentives to exert high effort. The
incentive compatibility constraint to obtain high effort (1) will not hold. Instead, the local
government will get m , so the individual rationality constraint for low effort,

p 2v (t

fixed

) + (1 − p 2 ) v ( t

fixed

) − c(a l ) ≥ m

will be binding, which means

p 2 v (t

fixed

) + (1 − p 2 ) v ( t

fixed

From this equation, we can get t

u

fixed

( low ) = m

) − c(a l ) = m

fixed

= v − 1 ( m + c ( a l )) , and
( 13 ) .

At the same time, for the farmer:

w fixed (low ) = p 2 ( x h − t fixed ) + (1 − p 2 )( x l − t fixed ) .
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Or w

fixed

( low ) = p 2 x h + (1 − p 2 ) x l − t

fixed

(14 ) .

It is easy to check that

w * ( high
Since t

fixed

) > w

fixed

( low )

( 15 )

= v − 1 ( m + c ( a l )) = t ( x l ) , we will have

w * ( low ) = w

fixed

( low )

( 15 ) '

To summarize the effects of the moral hazard problem, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition II, the moral hazard problem is related inherently to the current head
tax system in rural areas in China. The local government has no incentives to invest on
local infrastructures. 51 This disincentive problem is rooted in the current tax structure or
“constitution.” The outcome is not socially efficient, and there is room for Pareto
improvement.
Some Remarks on Proposition II
The current “constitution” is imperfect because of the incentive issue, not because
of the inefficiency from risk sharing. First, the local government has little incentive to
invest on the infrastructure in the rural area. The reason is simple: no matter what the
production level is, the tax can be collected is fixed. Under the assumption that the
probability of achieving higher production level is higher under higher effort of public
goods provision, according to equation (9) and (10), a higher level provision of public
goods surely means a Pareto improvement because the socially marginal benefit is
51

This conclusion is consistent with the data.
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greater than the socially marginal cost. Therefore we say that the outcome under the
current situation is not socially efficient. This is consistent with the observed facts.
Second, what is surprising is that the allocation of risks is efficient. In this system
the farmers take all risks, since the local government’s tax collection at the amount
of t

fixed

= v − 1 ( m + c ( a l )) is guaranteed no matter what the production level is.

This surprising outcome results from the assumption that the local government is risk
averse.
The central government stipulates the fixed tax in the constitution, in hope that
local government can use the money collected in this way to finance the infrastructure in
the rural areas. However, even if the local government has the incentive to invest on local
infrastructures, the revenue from the constitutional tax imposes a further limit on the
fulfillment of the task. The deficiency in revenue source of providing local public goods,
and more importantly, of fulfilling other local expenditure objectives, promotes local
governments to collect more than the stipulated fixed amount from farmers. In the past
several years, the central government issued a lot of regulations to impose a ceiling on
the revenue that local governments are allowed to collect from the farmers. One of the
most important regulations is that the local government can only collect up to 5% of the
farmer’s total annual revenues. In the reality, the local governments circumvent the
regulation by artificially exaggerating the farmers’ income or the tax base and therefore
collecting bigger amount. Or, alternatively, farmers are forced to conduct special
agriculture activities such as growing special economic plants. These economic plants
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may be important raw materials to the local enterprises, which is in turn important to the
local tax base; or can bring about higher tax by themselves since taxes from these special
products are proportional to the production. For example, every year the Xin County
government in Henan Province stipulates the farmers in their jurisdiction plant Chinese
chestnuts, which is an important economic crop contributing to local revenue. 52
Sometimes the farmers have to sacrifice the production of other more important
agricultural products in order to meet the mandates from the county government. Then on
the one hand, little incentive of providing public goods that are beneficial to agricultural
production lowers the probability of obtaining higher production. On the other, many
items of surcharges collected often by coercive power, in addition to the fixed tax,
worsen the farmers’ situation. If there is a good harvest, after submitting the taxes to the
local government, the farmers might be able to maintain a fair life. If the production level
is low, however, there will be a possibility of potential social instability. 53 To solve this
problem we may need reforms in other sectors such as constructing more complete
property rights, building up more efficient legal system, etc. However, before those can
be done, in the following we are going to propose a solution by promoting local
government’s incentive of providing public infrastructures, and therefore improve
farmer’s welfare by at least make it more probable

52

for farmers to obtain good harvest.

This is from the author’s personal experience in Henan Province.
By this way, our approach provides a new explanation to the variance of the farmers’ living standard. This is
different from the view of “over exploitation” of the local government to the farmers’ output (Tao et al. 2003).
53

78

A Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem
The disconnection between the tax revenue and agriculture production leads to
the moral hazard problem. The solution to the problem lies in the incentive problem
behind the local governments. The solution in turn points to the direction where the
current tax reform should go.
Typically, to reach the solution we need to solve a two-stage model. First, we can
characterize the local government’s best response in stage two. 54 In this case, the central
government cannot force the local government to participate; instead, the central has to
offer the local at least the reservation revenue of what the current resource can bring
about, m . Therefore, the individual rationality constraint must hold. Also, if we assume
equation (9) or (10) hold, then it is optimal for the central government to induce higher
effort. In this context, the incentive compatibility constraint must hold; otherwise the
local government will not exert a higher-level effort.
We turn next to the central government’s revenue maximization problem at stage
one. Since the center can solve the local government’s second stage problem as well as
the local government can, the central government should anticipate that the local
government’s reaction to the tax structure t i (x ) would be to choose the effort level of
investment a * (t i ( x)) , taking into consideration of

t i (x) . Specifically, we want to

54
In theory, if the agent is risk-neutral, the principal can “sell” the land to the agent. However, even if the local
government is risk-neutral here, the central cannot sell the land to the local. The reason is that, without requirement in
other part of the “constitution,” local government may not be interested in investing on agriculture sector.
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construct the tax schedule in such a way that the local government will provide higher
level of effort. Therefore, the central government’s problem at the first stage amounts to

{t

i

max
h
i

( x

), t

( x

l

}

) ,

w =

p1( x

h

− ti(x

h

)) + ( 1 − p 1 )( x

l

− t i ( x l ))

Such that the following two constraints

p 1 v ( t i ( x h )) + (1 − p 1 ) v ( t i ( x )) − c ( a h ) ≥ m

(IR)

p1v (t i ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )v (t i ( x l )) − c ( a h ) ≥ p 2 v (t i ( x h )) + (1 − p 2 )v (t i ( x l )) − c ( a l )
(IC)
In our model, offering some incentives means that both the incentive
compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint should be binding. The
reason is that, firstly, the local government is assumed to be risk averse. The central
government can give local government some insurance by narrowing the difference
between t ( x h ) and t ( x l ) in order to reduce the variance of the tax revenue, and making
the incentive compatibility constraint hold at the same time. Second, the benefit that the
central government offers to local government must be as high as the alternative return,
m . So we get the following two equations. 55

p1v(t i ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )v(t i ( x l )) − c( a h ) = p2 v(t i ( x h )) + (1 − p2 )v(t i ( x l )) − c ( a l )
p1v (t i ( x h )) + (1 − p1 ) v (t i ( x l )) − c ( a h ) = m
The associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the usual ones. Also, both of the shadow
prices are positive. Thus we have the following solutions.

55

The superscript i here means “imperfect information.”

(16)
(17 )
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ti(xh) = v

−1

⎛
(1 − p 2 ) c ( a h ) − (1 − p 1 ) c ( a l ) ⎞
⎜⎜ m +
⎟⎟
p1 − p 2
⎝
⎠

⎛
p 1c ( a l ) − p 2 c ( a h ) ⎞
⎟⎟
t i ( x l ) = v − 1 ⎜⎜ m +
p1 − p 2
⎝
⎠

( 18 )

( 19 )

The solution is essentially a compromise of incentives and risk sharing. Under
this new tax structure, we will have the local government’s utility is

u *i (high) = p1v(t i ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )v(t i ( x l ) − c(a h ) = m
And the farmer’s profit is

w *i ( high ) = p1 ( x h − t i ( x h )) + (1 − p1 )( x l − t i ( x l ))

( 20 ) .

We will discuss the policy implications later in detail.
To summarize, we have the following proposition.
Proposition III: A contract described by (18) and (19) can solve the moral hazard
problem in the current tax system. The optimal contact requires the risk-averse agent
share some risks with the principal, so there is no full insurance offered to local
government.
Some Remarks on Proposition III

{

}

Equation (18) and (19) design a new “constitution” t i ( x h ), t i ( x l ) with
incomplete information. To understand the characteristics of the constitution

{t ( x
i

h

}

), t i ( x l ) , we need to compare it with the solutions under complete information and

under the current tax structure.
About the production level
Let us consider the effects of the new “constitution” on the farmer’s benefits.

81

Comparing equation (14) with equation (20), we can easily show that

w * i ( high ) > w fixed ( low ) . Further, when comparing equation (6) and (20), we can
find whether we have w (high) ≥ w (high) , or,
*i

*

w *i ( high ) − w * ( high ) = (t ( x h ) − t i ( x l )) − p1 (t i ( x h ) − t i ( x l )) ≥ 0
It depends on the value of the difference between t i ( x h ) and t i ( x l ) . This
difference determines if the central government has incentive to carry out the new tax
structure. Actually in this simple case, the difference will be zero, leaving the central
indifferent to it. But the perfect information that we assumed in the benchmark case is
idealistic. Under imperfect information, the new tax structure gives the central higher
welfare compared with the fixed tax case, therefore is more favorable.
Two outcomes can be derived from the above analysis. Firstly,

w * i ( high ) > w

fixed

( low ) shows that the new production level resulted from the

higher effort induced by the new constitution is definitively higher than the production
level under the fixed tax. By attaching the production level to the tax revenue, the local
government would have incentives to invest on agriculture sector. The increased
provision of public goods increases the probability of achieving higher production level.
The new tax system will increase welfare in term of the efficiency in production.
Secondly, the allocation of the increased production between the farmer and the
local government depends on some parameters. In our model, the utilities local
government can obtain in both cases are the same whether the new tax structure is
adopted or not. But a higher expected return is associated with the new tax structure
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{t

i

}

( x h ), t i ( x l ) . The benefit of the local government can gain from the increased

expected return is offset by the increased risks associated with the new constitution. The
reason is that, for the risk-averse local government, some risk premiums are needed to
compensate for the loss caused by exposing to risks. Apparently, here all the increased
benefits go to the farmers. This is not the general case, however. A simple model like
what we are using in this paper cannot determine the general allocation of increased
benefit. 56
About the risk sharing issue
This section is designed to compare the efficiency of risk allocation between the
new “constitution” and those of benchmark and current tax system.
(i) New “constitution” v. s. the Benchmark
Different from the first-best case, in a second-best world, there is no full
insurance available to the local government. In the benchmark model with perfect
information, when the higher-level outcome is realized, the local government will get
t ( x h ) = v −1 (m + c(a h )) . With imperfect information, when the higher-level outcome is

⎛
(1 − p2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) ⎞
⎟⎟ , which
achieved, the associated return is t i ( x h ) = v −1 ⎜⎜ m +
p1 − p2
⎝
⎠
is bigger than t ( x h ) = v −1 (m + c(a h )) . 57 This positive difference means that the local

56

To consider a model that involves benefit allocation, we can think of a model with a bonus. Bonus is widely used in
firms that use high-power incentive programs. In the case with bonus, the bonus itself can be regarded as one form of
redistribution of efficiency gain brought about by the incentive programs between the principal and the agent.
57
Please refer to proof in appendix.
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government can gain more with incomplete information than with complete information
when the higher-level outcome is realized.
When the lower-level outcome is realized, we have different story, however. With
complete information, the return associated with lower-output is t ( x l ) = v −1 (m + c(a l )) .
Under incomplete information, when the lower-level outcome is realized, the return

⎛
p c( a l ) − p2 c( a h ) ⎞
⎟⎟ , which is smaller than t ( x l ) = v −1 (m + c(a l )) . 58
is t i ( x l ) = v −1 ⎜⎜ m + 1
p
p
−
1
2
⎝
⎠
Therefore, the local government would gain less with incomplete information than that
with complete case when the lower-level outcome is achieved.
The effects of incentive highly depend on the values of t i ( x h ) and t i ( x l ) ,
which determine how powerful the incentive is. We should, however, focus on the lower
tax, t i ( x l ) . The reason is that the magnitude of t i ( x h ) , increasing the variance of the
expected return in a good direction, therefore is good for the local government for it
enables local government to obtain higher revenue. What really matters is the difference
between t ( x l ) and t i ( x l ) , since a very low value of t i ( x l ) will result in very low
revenue proceeds for the local government by increasing the variance of the expected
return in a bad direction. As the difference between t ( x l ) and t i ( x l ) becomes bigger,
the revenue of the local government becomes more unfavorable (Chavas 2004). 59

58

Please refer to proof in appendix.
There is more detailed account on the upside and downside variation in chapter 6, Mean Variance Analysis, in the
book cited above.

59
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This difference can be expressed as

⎛
p c( a l ) − p2 c( a h ) ⎞
⎟⎟ . We already proved above
t ( x l ) − t i ( x l ) = v −1 (m + c(a l )) − v −1 ⎜⎜ m + 1
p1 − p2
⎝
⎠
that this expression is greater than zero. Comparing the arguments of the inverse function
we can have that the difference is determined by the difference between c(a h ) and
c(a l ) . As the difference becomes bigger, the effects of the incentive become more
powerful. In this case, compared with the first-best case, the expected tax in the
second-best world is more risky.
Obviously, there is an efficiency loss caused by the new risk allocation. This risk
allocation is not efficient because the two parties have different attitudes toward the risk.
The efficient risk allocation requires that the risk-neutral central government take all
risks and the risk-averse local government be risk free. To obtain a higher production
level, we need to give local government incentives. The only way to do so, however, is to
let the risk averse local governments share some risks.
(ii) New “constitution” v. s. the current tax system
Compared with the current fixed-tax system, the new “constitution” is again
inefficient in term of risk sharing, since the risk-averse local government has to share
some risks. However, the new “constitution” is socially efficient in terms of
second-best. 60 This is because the efficiency loss in risk sharing will be compensated by
the efficiency gains in production.
60

The second-best means that the central government can not observe the behaviors of local government behaviors
perfectly, different from the perfect information that we assumed in the benchmark case.
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Therefore no matter compared with the benchmark case or the current system, the
new “constitution” is inefficient in term of risk sharing. This efficiency loss, as we
analyzed above, is actually the price in exchange for the efficiency gain in the production
because the latter requires the local government take some risks. This trade-off is
inherently rooted in the solution to the current Chinese tax system. What we need to do is
optimally allocate the incentives and risk sharing to a point such that the gain from
higher incentive equals to the loss from risk reallocation.
Implications for Tax Policy Design
After solving the moral hazard problem, the question becomes where we should
go in reforming the Chinese current tax system. The following questions should be
answered before reforming the system.
Question 1, should we give up the fixed head tax system?
The answer to this question is definitely yes. But before we can do it, we will
have to find an alternative to replace the current tax.
Question 2, shall we change the uniform tax structure?
The uniform “constitution” across the whole country may not be efficient. From
Proposition I, we can see that the optimal choice of t * may be very different across the
country because each individual locality has its own unique production function, based
on which the actual choice is determined. In a greatly diversified country like China, the
production function may not be uniform. As a result, the values of c(a h ) and c(a l )
can vary significantly across the whole country. The uniform tax totally neglects the
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variations and thus is problematic. However, that would imply a very complex
“constitution” or tax system.
Question 3, do we need an agriculture tax?
We will encounter a typical conflict between two principles of tax policy in
discussing this problem. On one hand, a tax should be based on ability to pay. On the
other hand, tax should be levied on those who can benefit from the services financed by
the tax revenue. If the first principal is adopted, there should be no tax on the farmers at
all, since the farmers in China are typically too poor to pay any taxes. If the second is
adopted, the government should tax the farmers because the infrastructures in the rural
areas in China can improve agriculture production and thus benefit the farmers.
If we consider efficiency only, this conflict can be solved such that the center
takes all responsibilities to construct the dams and roads and other infrastructures to a
point where the marginal benefits equalize the marginal costs, without agricultural tax
collected from the farmers. This solution implicitly redistributes income from
non-agriculture sectors to agriculture sector and is appealing at the first sight. In the real
world, there have also been intensive discussions on the legitimacy of eliminating the
head tax since last year. The prime minister, Wen Jiabao has announced the goal of
abandoning the agriculture tax in the coming five years. And Hangzhou Prefecture
government has already eliminated this tax. It apparently becomes an important element
of the current tax reform and is launching. However, this option may not be a good
solution, since it will lead to another type of moral hazard problem. The arrangement that
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center takes all responsibility means that the infrastructures become free lunch for
farmers. A higher demand than optimum on center’s investment will not be a surprise.
Also, without agriculture tax, the government will not have any incentive to invest in
agriculture sector at all!
In addition to the lack of appeal on the economic ground, this solution, however,
may be very difficult to implement because of the characteristics of the current political
regime and long-standing ideology of giving priority to industry instead of agriculture,
even though it is long been advocated that more weight should be allocated to the latter,
as we mentioned in the part above.
We may still need an agriculture tax, but not the head tax that we currently have. If we can
design a tax relating the agriculture production with agriculture tax, as advocated by the imperfect
information case discussed in our model, then we might be able to not only provide local government
incentives to invest on infrastructures, but also guarantee tax revenues to fulfill the task.

Conclusion
It is not very easy to understand the behaviors of Chinese local government
within the traditional framework. In this paper, the behaviors of Chinese local
governments have been examined in a unique angle, by expanding B-B rule to include
the risk issue. A simple moral hazard model in a principal-agent framework has been
constructed to illustrate the problems inherent in the current agriculture tax system in
China and ways of solving the problems have been proposed. Our propositions may
throw new lights on the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. Of course, here we did
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not consider the transfers from the central government to local governments, thus such
situations as when the local governments collude with the farmers, in order to obtain
more transfers from the center; or when the local governments are simply corruptive in
delivering public goods and drive up the costs, the cases that will complicate the issue are
not included. We consider those possibilities for future developments.
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Appendix
Proof of Footnote 57:

⎛
(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) ⎞ h
⎟⎟ > t = v −1 (m + c(a h ))
⎜
t (x ) = v ⎜ m +
p1 − p 2
⎠
⎝
i

h

−1

Since the two taxes, the tax under higher production level in incomplete
information case, t i ( x h ) , and the tax under higher production level in the benchmark
case, t h are both denoted in the inverted function form, we can prove this inequality by
comparing the arguments.
Then our problem becomes the following:
(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l )
m+
− (m + c(a h ))
p1 − p 2
=

(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l )
− c(a h )
p1 − p 2

=

(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) ( p1 − p 2 )c(a h )
−
p1 − p 2
p1 − p 2

(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) − p1c(a h ) + p 2 c(a h )
=
p1 − p 2
c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) − p1c(a h )
=
p1 − p 2
=

(1 − p1 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l )
p1 − p 2

=

(1 − p1 )(c(a h ) − c(a l ))
p1 − p 2
According to our assumption, p1 − p 2 > 0 ; also we have (1 − p1 ) > 0 and

c(a h ) − c(a l ) > 0 . Therefore, both the nominator and the denominator are greater than
zero, and the whole term is greater than zero. Then we have
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m+

(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l )
− (m + c(a h )) > 0
p1 − p 2
We assumed earlier that v (•) is strictly increasing in t, thus we will have that the

v −1 (•) is also strictly increasing. Therefore, we have

⎛
(1 − p 2 )c(a h ) − (1 − p1 )c(a l ) ⎞
⎟⎟ > v −1 (m + c(a h ))
v −1 ⎜⎜ m +
p1 − p 2
⎠
⎝

Or t i ( x h ) > t h .
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Proof of Footnote 58:

⎛
p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h ) ⎞ l
⎟⎟ < t = v −1 (m + c(a l ))
⎜
t (x ) = v ⎜ m +
p1 − p 2
⎠
⎝
i

l

−1

Since the two taxes, the tax under lower production level in incomplete
information case, t i ( x l ) , and the tax under higher production level in the benchmark
case, t l are both denoted in the inverted function form, we can prove this inequality by
comparing the respective arguments.
Then our problem becomes the following:

p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h )
− (m + c(a l ))
m+
p1 − p 2
p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h )
=
− c(a l )
p1 − p 2
=

p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h ) ( p1 − p 2 )c(a l )
−
p1 − p 2
p1 − p 2

=

p1c( a l ) − p 2 c(a h ) − p1c(a l ) + p 2 c(a l )
p1 − p 2

=

− p 2 c( a h ) + p 2 c ( a l )
p1 − p 2

p 2 (c(a l ) − c(a h ))
=
p1 − p 2

We assumed in the essay that p1 − p 2 > 0 , also we have that c(a l ) − c(a h ) < 0.
Therefore we have that
m+

p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h )
− (m + c(a l )) < 0
p1 − p 2
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Since we assumed earlier that v (•) is strictly increasing in t, thus we will have
that v −1 (•) is strictly increasing. Therefore, we have

⎛
p1c(a l ) − p 2 c(a h ) ⎞
⎟⎟ < v −1 (m + c(a l ))
⎜
v ⎜m +
p1 − p 2
⎠
⎝
−1

Or t ( x ) < t .
i

l

l

CHAPTER III
ESSAY II BUDGET STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
Introduction
The theoretical model we dealt with in the first essay established the foundation
of this current work. We have established that in theory, government does exhibit
strategic behaviors, which results in different consequences. However, does the picture
really look like this when we turn to the reality? Can we provide some evidence of our
own to supplement the work already done? It is currently not possible to test the validity
of the model we developed in the context of China, due to the data availability. Thus we
turn to a broader viewpoint and try to find evidence from countries all over the world to
test the theory developed in the first essay.
A fact we observe is that as economic growth and human activities increasingly
have a negative impact on the natural environment, with more and more serious
consequences start to produce negative feedback to human lives.
Environmental quality control has gained an increasingly important role in
government policy and businesses practices as people become more aware of the
consequences of a polluted environment.
Nonetheless, there is a big gap in the level of economic growth and development
across countries and the same is true for the environmental quality across countries. This
93
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difference in environmental quality can be attributed to the variations in economic
conditions, natural endowments, social factors as well as government policies.
The specific question we are interested in is: do differences in government budget
structure give government agencies different incentives to engage in environmental
quality control?
Before the 1990s, differences in economic growth across countries were cited as
the standard explanation for the observed variation in environmental quality. Pollution
was interpreted as an unavoidable by-product of industrialization, and therefore it was
seen as an increasing function of economic growth. Following this point of view,
developed economies have seen their environments damaged at a faster pace than
developing economies (Meadows et al. 1972).
However, beginning in the early 1990s, a number of empirical studies showed
that the relationship between pollution and economic growth was not as simple as it was
thought before. 61 Pollution was found not to be a monotone function, but rather a
concave function of GDP. This result became known in the literature as the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), borrowed from the classic Kuznets Curve, which
relates the distribution of income to the level of income. EKC states that in the early
stage of economic growth, pollution increases. Once GDP per capita achieves certain
level, the relationship reverses. In other words, economic growth contributes to the

61

These empirical works are mostly on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), a literature that we review later in
this essay.
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reduction of pollution once it achieves a certain level. The reason is that economic
growth creates demand for higher environment quality; the better definition of property
rights and other institutional arrangements make it possible to reduce pollution and
improve environmental quality.
The EKC hypothesis explains the variations in environmental quality mostly
through the variations in GDP per capita. 62 But a lot of other factors are surely missing
from this framework. In particular, from our point of view, the fact that environmental
quality is a public good should be recognized; therefore government behavior must be
taken into consideration explicitly when we try to understand environmental variations.
Environmental quality can affect government behaviors through two different
channels. On the revenue side, pollution is positively related to production levels, which
in turn represent the tax base of major taxes, such as the VAT and other business related
taxes. Since higher production means higher tax revenues, government may tolerate
higher levels of pollution for the purpose of obtaining higher income, thus resulting in a
relatively low effort of pollution control. This can be measured by the importance of VAT
and other business related taxes in total tax revenue.
On the other hand, pollution can damage other tax bases. This is especially true in
the case of the property taxes. The extent of this damage may also affect government’s

62
In our opinion, “environmental behavior” is a more precise term than “environmental quality”. Environmental
quality is actually the consequence of the agent’s environmental behaviors. For example, some communities pollute
more than others; while they spend more money in dealing with pollution problems at the same time. However, some
communities do not take responsibilities for the consequences caused by their behaviors. However, in order to be
consistent with previous studies, we are following the traditional use of the term, environmental quality.
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incentives on the revenue side of the budget to control pollution. This can be captured by
the share of property tax in total tax revenue.
On the expenditure side of the budget, more pollution means more expenditure on
healthcare, due to the negative effects most pollutants have on human health, thus
pollution levels may significantly affect the composition of government budgetary
expenditure. But the government’s incentives to control pollution may vary depending on
how costly pollution may be to the budget. This latter maybe roughly approximated by
the ratios of government expenditure on health care over total public expenditure. There
is some obvious endogeneity issue here: the level of pollution affects health care
expenditures, but the composition of the budget, which also reflects how much we care
about pollution, may also affect the level of pollution, or at least anti-pollution policy
efforts. This will be a problem we have to deal with in our estimation.
In addition, the political characteristics of different countries might have an
impact on the policy making process for different governments, including the
environmental policy. For example, democratic countries and non-democratic countries
might care about the environmental quality to a different extent, since in the former,
voting system works well and the preferences and interests of the residents are more fully
respected; while in the latter case, the authoritarian way of decision making does not
necessarily take into account the needs of the residents. Thus the country’s political
regime might play a role in maintaining environmental quality.
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This essay is intended to capture the relationship between budget structure and
government’s incentive of pollution control, with the hope of offering a new angle in
tackling the environment problems.
This essay is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the EKC
hypothesis, which we take to be the prevailing explanation on the relationship between
economic growth and environment quality, and point out the main weaknesses of this
hypothesis. In Section III, we offer a new explanation, which takes into account
government incentives for controlling pollution level under different budget structures. In
section IV, we develop a theoretical model, based on the Leviathan government’s revenue
maximization hypothesis, formalizing the relationship between budget structure and
pollution control. Then we offer three propositions following the implications derived
from our theoretical model, which may have important policy relevance for environment
policy. The first hypothesis states that the higher the ratio of business related taxes as
proxied by general value added, sales, or turnover taxes collections in total revenue, the
lower incentive of the government to control pollution and thus the higher the pollution
level. The second states that higher percentage of property tax in total tax revenue will
give governments an incentive to lower pollution level. 63 The third one says the higher
the share of government health care expenditure in total public expenditure, the lower the
pollution level. 64 In Sections V and VI, we test the three hypotheses, using a

63
This is based on the assumption that most of the pollution has an impact on urban areas where housing is
concentrated, a point that we will come back to later.
64
Of course, the endogeneity issue should be taken care of first.
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cross-section, time series data set including 108 countries over the time period of
1990-2002. Our results suggest that, changes in budget structure may have an important
impact on government behaviors and therefore on the environmental performance.
Therefore, government incentives to fight pollution should be taken into account when
making environmental policy decisions.
The Conventional Hypothesis on Economic Growth and Environment Quality (EKC)
Before the 1980s, economists traditionally thought that more developed
economies were damaging their environments at a faster pace (Meadows et al. 1972); the
conventional wisdom was that environmental quality gets worse as the economy grows.
However, the changes in demand for environmental quality and the actual level of it were
not consistent with this traditional view. In the 1980s, the empirical evidence showed that
people in advanced economies had a very strong demand for environmental quality. The
reason appears to be quite simple: environmental quality is a normal good; therefore as
people become richer, through conventional income effects, people demand more of it.
Therefore, as economies grow, environmental quality actually improves rather than
deteriorates.
Motivated by this new evidence, economists in the early 1990s began to
challenge the old view. They found some empirical evidence to show that the relationship
between economic growth and environment quality was non-linear (Grossman and
Krueger 1994; Panayotou 1995; 1992). In fact, environmental quality was found to be a
concave function of economic growth. At the early stages of economic growth, when the
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activities are small in scale, the economy does not produce much pollution. As the
economy grows and production begins to expand, the benefits from production increase,
but so do the pollution levels. At some point, pollution levels reach their peak. Beyond
this point, the demand for environment quality increases because the disutility from
higher pollution now outweighs the “benefit” from pollution (in terms of higher pollution
being the by-product of higher production and incomes), and people now are not only
willing to, but also are capable of controlling pollution due to the growing income level
and technology available; therefore at some stage of economic growth, the pollution level
begins to fall. 65 EKC is essentially a hypothesized relationship between levels of various
indicators of environmental performance and GDP per capita, with the relationship
depicted as taking an inverted-U shape.
The EKC has important policy implications. It predicts that economic growth
itself will be sufficient to improve the environmental quality. If the EKC hypothesis
holds, we can draw the conclusions that once economic growth reaches certain level, it
will have a positive effect on environmental quality. Therefore, there is no need to worry
too much about pollution problems.
Some Empirical Evidence
Fundamentally, the EKC is an empirical phenomenon. Among other studies,
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993; 1995), Grossman and Krueger

65

All EKC literature traditionally investigates the relationship of economic growth and environmental indicators, and
the level of economic growth usually measured by GDP per capita. In this essay we follow this tradition.
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(1994), Selden and Song (1994) are widely recognized as the earliest EKC contributors
(Yandle 2002). Grossman and Krueger (1994) tried to verify the existence of EKCs using
data for SO2, dark matter, and SPM (Suspended particulate matter) from GEMS (Global
Environmental Monitoring System), published by the World Health Organization. These
data measured ambient air quality in two or three locations in each city within a number
of countries during the period 1977-1988. Their regressions included location, time and
also a trade intensity variable. In their results, SO2 and dark matter conform to the EKC
hypothesis, first increasing with income, then starting to decrease after some level of
income; while the level of SPM exhibits a monotone declining trend even at the
low-income level, without reaching some turning point. Selden and Song (1994)
estimated the EKCs for SO2, NOx, SPM and CO using a cross-section and time-series
data set from World Resources, taking into consideration of country specific effects and
time specific effects, as well as population density. They obtained results favorable to
EKCs except for CO. In his influential paper, Panayotou (1993; 1995) estimated EKCs
for SO2, NOx, SPM and deforestation using a cross-section data set. His conclusions
provide support to EKC hypothesis in that the estimated curves for SO2, NOx and SPM
do exhibit an inverted-U shape with respect to income per capita. For example, his
regression outcome on SO2 takes the
form ln( SO 2 / P ) = − 35 .26 + 8 .3 ln( Y / P ) − 0 .51{ln( Y / P )} , clearly exhibiting an
2

inverted-U shape.
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A lot of studies have estimated the turning points of income, i.e., at what level of
income the environmental quality starts to improve. Usually for different pollutants,
studies found that the turning points are different. For example, Grossman and Krueger
(1994) found that for SO2 and dark matter, the turning points could be achieved when
per capita GDP is around $4000-5000 in 1985 U.S. dollars. In Panayotou (1993)’s work,
if measured in 1985 U. S. dollars, he obtained the turning points for SO2 at per capita
GDP of around $3000, around $5,500 for NOx, and around $4,500 for SPM. 66 In terms
of the regression function above, it means the level of SO2 pollution decreases at per
capita GDP of around $3000.
Some Problems with the EKC
Since its birth, the EKC evidence has been in the center of debate. In general,
there is consensus in the literature that the EKCs suffer from some problems. A first
problem concerns the data that researchers have been using. Most of the EKC literature
uses data aggregated over different units, which imposes a potential heteroskedasticity
problem (Stern 2003; Stern 1996). In addition, the environmental data available to
researchers are not necessarily reliable since the environment is notorious for its
volatility and makes it extremely difficult to obtain environment related data, let alone
reliable data. A second problem is that, as Arrow et al (1995) pointed out, the EKCs only
consider the impact of production on the pollution of the environment, assuming that
there are no feedback effects from the environment to the production process. This
66

In Yandle (2002), there is a good summary of turning points in different EKC literature.
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assumption seems impractical in view of the ever-increasing economic activities
worldwide and the limited carrying capacity of the environment. When, for example, the
rate at which the production process consuming underground water resources exceeds the
capability of the natural water system to make up the loss, the environment might impose
adverse effects to the production process, either take the forms of deterioration of water
quality or land collapse. A third problem is that the EKC literature does not take into
consideration of other factors such as environmental regulation, relative advantages in
international trade, etc. Strict environmental regulation in developed countries may
prompt manufacturers to move their heavy-polluting industries to developing countries
(Stern 2003). 67 Developed countries are more and more concentrating on capital and
human capital-intensive service sectors, which is helpful for the improvement of
environmental quality (Hettige, Lucas, and Wheeler 1992).
More fundamentally, even if the relationship between environmental indicators
and GDP per capita does exist, what is the reason behind that? The EKCs believe that as
income increases and people demand higher environmental quality, environmental
quality will be improved by market power, instead of the effects of government
intervention. Thus, it leaves no room or at least it does not require the role of government.
However, in the real world, government is the provider of most public goods, including
environmental quality control. As any other public good, the extent of environmental

67

This is the “race to the bottom” that we are going to dwell upon later.
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quality control is very likely to be determined through a public choice process. 68 In
addition, the EKC hypothesis allows no role for the institutional differences between
governments, for example, with or without democratic voting systems, of course the
environmental outcomes will be affected significantly.
Being aware of these points certainly raises several important questions. For
example, even in countries in which there are effective democratic voting systems, the
residents may not be able to control government behaviors simply by elections. 69 Then,
in countries without voting system, what factors influence the decisions making of the
government? Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of environmental
performance in different countries, we need to examine the role of government,
analyzing how government behavior can affect environmental quality, both directly and
indirectly.
Budget Structure, Government Behavior and Pollution Control
By most standards, environmental quality is a public good, even though some
part of it is a local public good, and another part is a “global” public good. The reasons
are obvious. Environmental quality shares two properties with other public goods, such
as national defense and street lights: being non-rival and non-excludable. 70 The
environmental quality we are talking about here includes the quality of clean water, clear
68

For example, the demand for a particular level of environmental quality can be regarded as a choice of the median
voter, according to median voter model (MVM). However, there will be some other problems if we apply the MVM
here, mainly due to the problems inherent in the MVM, such as the preference needs to be single peaked, and so on.
69
See for example the discussion of the original work on Leviathan model, in Buchanan and Brennan (1977; 1978;
1980). See also Niskanen (1968; 1971)for the original bureaucratic model of decision making in government.
70
However, we could define the abuse of the environment (e.g. the atmosphere) by one country reduces the level of the
good available elsewhere. For example, acid rain is such a case.
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air and so on. There may be some rivalry: if one person uses the clean water or clear air,
there might be less of it available to others. Use of water may also be excludable since
people who do not have access to water can be excluded from its use. In this sense, these
goods are not strictly pure public goods. Nonetheless, water and air are both renewable
resources, especially under current technologies; thus, we can call them public goods
without violating the general definition of a public good.
In general, public goods are provided by the government and financed by taxes or
user fees. The residents consume the public goods and at the same time pay tax to
finance the provision of these goods.
As mentioned above, the EKC hypothesis assumes no role for government. This
assumption, however, does not appear to be very reasonable since governments across
the world are influential in almost every aspect of the economy.
In general, from the perspective of this essay, governments can be grouped into
two types, democratic and non-democratic. Democratic countries use voting and other
procedures to form the social preference over public goods, while in non-democratic
countries voting does not exist or does not work, and collective decisions are made in
some authoritarian manner. Even within the same type, the level of government that is
responsible for environmental quality control may be very different. In some democratic
regimes, it is central government’s responsibility to regulate environmental problems, in
order to enjoy the benefits of economies of scales, and avoid the potential side effects,
such as spillovers of pollution. Under this circumstance, it is still possible that local

105

governments have an important impact on pollution. For example, in the US where
environmental problems are largely the responsibility of the federal government, New
York City and eight state governments have planned to sue power plants. 71 The reason is
that the emissions of the power plants, as they put it, “pose serious threats to our health,
our economy and our environment.” In some other democratic countries, however, the
authority to regulate environment is assigned to government agencies at the state
(regional) or local levels in order to accommodate for the diversities in preferences and
needs in different localities. This can create problems of its own, but we will not expand
this line of research in here. 72
No matter which level of government is responsible for the environmental quality
control, the government’s incentives to achieve the goals of environmental improvement,
in addition to the capability of doing so, are important issues that need special attention.
There are relatively few papers in the literatures that have explored the role of
environmental governance. The work by Dasgupta et al. (2004) is unique from this
perspective. Their results show that governance does play an important role in
controlling environmental quality. Without strong environmental governance, rich
countries whose incomes already reached the turning point predicted by the EKC
hypothesis would not necessarily accomplish the actual decrease of pollution levels.
71

The states include California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin,

from the New York Times, July 21, 2004.
72
For example, Oates (2001) differentiated between three different cases in which he treats environment quality as
pure public goods, local public goods, or the pollution can flow across boundaries and results in spillovers. Depending
on different situations, different level of governments or the coordination by different level of governments should be
responsible for the formation and implementation of environmental policies.
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Similarly, we will expect that “low levels of development do not prevent countries from
having effective environmental institutions and policies” (Dasgupta et al. 2004).
Therefore, poor countries can achieve high level of environmental quality if strong
environmental governance is in place. Thus, Dasgupta et al. (2004) observe that the EKC
framework is misleading since it suggests only when income achieves certain level can
the level of pollution possibly starts to fall. In their view, the policy of “grow first, then
clean up” is invalid. 73
In the public finance literature, as mentioned in the first essay, there are three
main models about government behaviors. The first one is median voter model (MVM).
The MVM is the most popularly used tool in the field to analyze the outcome of public
choice within a democratic context. A voting system is used to form the public preference
for public goods under a democratic regime. The median voter is defined as the voter
whose preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters’ preferences (Rosen 1999).
The MVM hypothesizes that as long as all preferences are single peaked; the outcome of
majority voting reflects the preferences of the median voter.
When we apply MVM to test empirically the demand for public goods, for
example, we need to make an inherent assumption that each jurisdiction’s (county, state,
or country) preference is represented by the preference of the median voter in the
jurisdiction. As mentioned earlier, in order to analyze the relationship between
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They also look at the effects of geographic vulnerability to environmental damage and the sectoral composition of
economic activity.
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environmental quality and GDP per capita within the MVM framework, we need more
assumptions such as that GDP per capita can be used as a proxy to the median voter’s
income; that the preference of residents should be normally distributed and single
peaked.
Even if it is justifiable to interpret EKCs as the outcome of median voter’s choice,
the MVM has some serious weakness itself. Theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence show that the citizens cannot perfectly control government behaviors through
the voting system (Matsusaka 1995; McGuire 1999). In addition, not all countries are
democratic and have effective voting system. Just as we mentioned above, there are
non-democratic countries, where no voting system exists, neither does MVM work. What
is more, MVM is usually used to explain different social choices across localities within
a country, while environmental policy is often the central government’s policy target,
even though sometimes being left within local governments’ discretion; thus MVM
might have difficulties in explaining the cross-country variations of environmental
policies. Due to these reasons, we think that MVM is not an appropriate vehicle to
explain the variations in environment performance across countries.
Alternatively, there are other two competing hypotheses about government
behaviors: the Leviathan model and the bureaucratic model, which we mentioned in the
first essay. The Leviathan model holds that the government can be modeled as an
organization with its own interests. Without effective control from the citizens, the
government may be willing to exploit its constituencies fiscally, trying to maximize its
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potential revenue sources, or using minimum resources to meet some requirements, thus
becoming a revenue-maximizing Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan 1977, 1978, 1980).
This Leviathan has an inherent tendency to maximize budgetary revenue; therefore the
size of the government tends to be bigger than optimal. In the literature, the Leviathan
model holds that the more decentralized the government structure, the tax competition
among decentralized governments will put more restrictions on the government’s
intrusion into the economy, therefore, the smaller the size of the government.
Researchers have controversy over the evidence on the relationship between
decentralization and government size, however. For example, Oates (1985) found no
relationship between decentralization and government size, while Stein (1999) found that
fiscal decentralization led to larger governments in Latin America; and Marlow (1988),
Grossman (1989) found negative relationship between decentralization and government
spending.
According to the so-called bureaucratic model developed mainly by Niskanen
(1968; 1971), bureaus are monopoly suppliers of the services they provide, with political
sponsors as their monopoly buyers. Bureaus exchange a specific output by bargaining
with the political sponsors for a specific budget. Also the bureaus have information
advantages over the production costs, while the sponsors have neither the incentives nor
the capabilities to monitor the behaviors of the bureaus due to symmetric information. In
addition, Bureaucrats have their own utility functions, including “salary, perquisites of
the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of managing the bureau, and ease of
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making changes” (Niskanen 1975). Therefore bureaucrats will try to maximize their own
interests, instead of maximizing social welfare (Niskanen 1971). In term of budgetary
behavior, bureaucrats will try to maximize the size of the their discretionary budget, in
order to get more out of it, of course subject to the cost constraint of producing certain
output (Niskanen 1975; 1994). Niskanen also provided some empirical evidence on the
overspending of the bureaus (Niskanen 1975).
Neither of these two models believes that voting systems can control government
behaviors; instead, they argue that the residents cannot monitor the governments (or the
government can not monitor the bureaucrats in the latter case) very effectively. This is so
because residents may not have information on which politician can better accommodate
their preferences. Or, citizens may not have enough incentives to vote because it is
difficult or even impossible for one single vote to change the outcome of the election.
Both models state that governments or bureaucrats try to maximize their own benefits,
defined as the “surplus” of the budget. 74
In our opinion, these two models have important implications for environmental
performance, since the impacts of environmental performance on different budget
structures give a Leviathan government or a bureaucratic official different incentive to
control pollution.

74

Both of these two models describe that the Leviathan government or the bureaucrats try to maximize the budget,
then after fulfilling the expenditure responsibilities mandated by the constitution, the rest will be surplus of budget,
from which the leviathan government or the bureaucrats can have more resource at discretion or simply derive more
personal benefits.
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Pollution, or poor environmental performance, has an impact on the Leviathan
government or the bureaucratic official from both the revenue side and the expenditure
side. On the revenue side, pollution could be both good and bad. Pollution is related
inherently to production in that, in general, higher level of production brings about higher
level of pollution. On the one hand, higher production can bring government higher
value-added tax or other tax revenues collected from expanded production activities and
enlarged economic base. On the other hand, however, higher levels of pollution that
come along with the higher level of production may in turn damage base of some other
taxes, in particular the property tax base.
As a rational agent, the government or bureaucrats would try to seek a balance
between those two in order to maximize their revenue target. Under this situation, the tax
structure may have a significant impact on the government’s incentives to deal with
pollution. If tax revenues are mostly taken up by business activity taxes, such as VAT, as
opposed to residential bases, such as the property tax, then government will have
incentive to expand economic activities, with the hope of compensating for the loss from
property tax with more revenue from VATs. The government may not have much interest
in controlling pollution in this case, since maximizing production means maximizing
revenue. Controlling for pollution levels requires reducing production activities, and
reducing tax revenue accordingly, therefore it could be irrational to make this decision
for the sake of the tax revenue. However, if most tax revenues are from property taxes, in
order to protect property tax base, government will have stronger incentive to control
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pollution and impose more strict environmental regulations to protect the environment,
lowering pollution levels as much as possible. Even though pollution is detrimental to the
atmosphere in remote areas, too, it will not have a direct impact on property tax.
Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, here we need to assume that we are focusing on the
pollution that negatively affects values of property in urban areas.
It is interesting to note that in normative systems of revenue assignments at
different levels of government, broad-based taxes, such as VAT and corporate income tax
are assigned at the central government level, while property taxes are a much more ideal
tax for local government (McLure 1983; Oates 1999) . These normative considerations
are very often followed in actual assignments. All other things equal, we would have,
therefore, that revenue maximizing local governments have much stronger interests in
pollution control than central government in countries following this way of tax
assignment. Consequently, we should expect in countries where property taxes have been
assigned as an important source of local revenue, the higher proportion the property tax
revenue takes up in local revenue, the more active environmental policies local
government will have incentive to implement at the local level. Or the local government
will impose pressure on the central government, if environmental policy decisions are
made by the latter. The proportion of property tax in total tax revenue for upper level
government, including states and federal government as in the US, will usually have no
such effects, or not evidently so clear. This is partly due to the fact that for upper level
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governments, the tax bases are more diversified, and property tax is usually not as a
significant revenue source as at local level.75
On the expenditure side, if healthcare were constitutionally assigned to the
government, the government or bureaucrats should have an incentive to curb pollution.
The reason is that many pollutants may negatively affect the human beings’ health status,
which may in turn increase the government expenditure on health care. If the share of
health care expenditure in total government expenditure is very high, in order to
maximize the “surplus,” less pollution would be preferred. If the share is very small, the
government or bureaucratic officials may not care about pollution that much. Different
from the case of considering property tax at central level and local level on the revenue
side, we do not differentiate between health expenditure at the central and local levels.
One of the reasons is that the data differentiated between local health expenditure and
central health expenditure is not generally available. In addition, the effect of pollution
on expenditure side should work for both the central government and the local
government, since neither of them will be oblivious to the pollution problem if health
expenditure takes up big shares in their budgetary expenditure. Therefore, in our analysis
we use health expenditure in total public expenditure in a general sense.
In the following section, we will develop a theoretical model, starting from the
revenue maximizing behaviors of a Leviathan government, formalizing the relationship
between budget structure and the government efforts of pollution control.
75

Besides, the negative consequence of pollution to the property tax base is more conspicuous at local level.
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The model
Before the formal construction of the model, it is necessary to make some
assumptions.
The economy
First we assume that the economy consists of only three key sectors and a
Leviathan-like government. The government collects taxes and provides public goods.
The residents cannot control the government behavior by voting system, either because
there exists an asymmetric information problem related to voting (Turnbull and Mitias
1999), or simply because there is no voting mechanism in some countries, or because the
voting system does not work. Instead, we assume the government is bounded by a
“constitution,” or the predetermined budget structure as described in essay one.
The first sector is manufacturing, which includes industries such as automobile,
chemical, clothing and many more others. This sector is assumed to be a pollution-maker,
with higher production bringing about more pollution. The second is real estate sector
that consists of properties that can be used commercially or residentially. The third is the
health care sector.
The last two sectors are assumed to produce no pollution at all. They are, rather,
influenced negatively by pollution. For the real estate sector, pollution may drive down
the market values for houses and land. For example, pollution may destroy some
historical sites, and then significantly shock the local tourism sector. Also, pollution may
make the environment in some community very unpleasant and lower the value of
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property through capitalization. Pollution also has a negative impact on people’s health
conditions, and thus imposes heavy burden on health care industry. For example, the
increases in the pollution level will increase the probability of people getting sick, as a
consequence the health care industry will have to spend more. This is well established in
the literature. 76
The “Constitution” (the Budget Structure)
Tax revenue
In the economy the goal of the Leviathan-like government is to fiscally exploit
the citizens, under the only constraint of the given constitution. On the revenue side, the
government is granted the power to levy two kinds of taxes by the constitution, a
business type tax such as VAT and a property tax. In addition, the tax rates are
pre-determined by the constitution because the voters know well that otherwise the
government would have an incentive to increase the tax rates at after-constitution stage in
order to obtain more tax revenue, as we argued in the first essay.
Expenditure
On the expenditure side, the voters also know that the government wants to make
the fiscal surplus as big as possible. Therefore it is rational for the government to spend
as little funds as possible in order to obtain more surpluses, if there are no constraints. To
deal with this problem, the constitution sets up some mandates on what the government
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For example, there is a causal relationship between pollution level and mortality rate (Dockery et al. 1993).
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should provide to the residents. We assume that the government is obligated to provide
public health services.
Thus the Leviathan government is required to provide two categories of public
goods. One is related to the health care provision. Expenditure on education,
infrastructure investment, social security and so on goes to the category of OTHERS,
denoted by G. The reason we divide the expenditure responsibilities in this way is based
on our assumption that the former category is influenced by pollution, while the latter is
not directly related to pollution.
Economic policy
As a government, we assume that the only economic policy instrument at the
Leviathan government’s discretion is environmental policy. The government can use this
instrument to serve its goal. In other words, the policy is a tool to balance the gain and
loss at the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget, respectively.
The Model Specification
To capture the exact impact of pollution on the Leviathan government’s behavior,
and how the pollution level is determined, we need to specify the following variables.
We first assume that the government can perfectly control the pollution level. So
the real pollution level d can be represented by the government efforts of controlling
pollution, e . This implies that the environmental policy can achieve the desirable level of
pollution, therefore the government can control the pollution to an extent that is optimal
to the government. For the relationship between real pollution level d and the
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government efforts of controlling pollution e , we have d = d (e) , and d ' (e) < 0 . Due to
this, we can use e instead of d to explain the relationship between pollution and other
variables. In other EKC literature, since the role of government is not a variable of
interest, usually the pollution level itself is used.77
On the revenue side, the government has two sources of revenue. The first one is

τ v , the only avenue for obtaining higher tax revenue is

business tax. Given the tax rate

to expand the manufacturing production as high as possible since production level is the
tax base of business tax. To increase its fiscal surplus, the Leviathan needs to seek the
expansion of the production activities as far as possible. Production in this economy is
inherently related to the level of pollution. As pointed out earlier, there is a positive
relationship between production level and pollution level. The expansion of the
production level will inevitably expand the pollution level. We assume that the
production level is a function of pollution level d and the government efforts to control
pollution: f = f (d (e)) and f e ( d ) > 0 . and f ' (e) =
'

∂f ∂d
•
< 0 . Hereafter, we will
∂d ∂e

ignore the real pollution level d , and focus on government efforts of pollution control,

e.
Because the base of the business tax is the production level, it relates to pollution
level and therefore indirectly relates to the government effort to control pollution. We
therefore define the base of business tax as V = V ( f (e)) , or simply V = V (e) . If
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In our estimation, we actually use the pollution levels instead, while controlling for the measure of governance,
mainly due to the difficulty of quantitatively measuring the effort of government pollution control.
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government applies higher environment standards and enforce the law more vigorously,
the production level would be lower because the government’s efforts of controlling
pollution can significantly increase the prices of the inputs, driving up the costs of the
production and reduce the profits. In some extreme case, the stringent pollution control
may even make production unprofitable and therefore force the exit of some firms. On
the other hand, if lower the environmental standards, the costs of locally produced
products will be reduced; therefore expanding production will be more profitable. Also,
more firms will enter the industry to take the advantages of these more polluter-friendly
environmental standards (Smarzynska and Wei 2001). Under both of these situations the
production would expand. Therefore there exists a negative relationship between
production level and government efforts of curbing pollution, or Ve' (e) < 0 and
Ve" (e) < 0 .

In addition, the production activity plays different levels of importance at
different stages of economic development (Balsdon 2003; Gallapher 2004). When GDP
per capita is low, the economy may not have strong production capacities. As the
economy grows, the manufacturing activities expand too. This positive relationship,
however, does not last forever. At some points, this positive relationship may become
negative in that developed countries may specialize on technology-intensive and human
capital-intensive industries that are less pollution-conducive (Hettige, Lucas, and
Wheeler 1992). 78
78
As countries become more developed, they tend to adopt human capital intensive technologies and provide more
services instead of simply manufacturing products, different from mining and chemistry industries that are prevail in
countries with lower level of development. Here we refer to those high-tech industries that require highly intensive
technology and human capital and don’t remit as much pollution as those relatively more primitive manufacturing
industries.
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One important phenomenon that needs to be pointed out is that, some developing
countries take great efforts to attract more FDI inflows, which allows developed
countries to relocate their heavy polluting industries to these developing countries, in
order to take advantage of the lower environmental standards of the destination countries.
This is the so called the “pollution heaven.” And even worse, if other countries get
threatened by the capital flight, they might reduce their environmental standards to keep
capital from moving out or to attract new investment, which is predicted by the “race to
the bottom” theory. The “race to the bottom” or the “pollution haven” hypothesis is still
in great controversy. Wheeler (2003), Eskeland and Harrison (1997) and many others
argue that the empirical studies do not support this line of thought. Nonetheless, there are
some studies showing evidence of support, for example, Smarzynska and Wei (2001),
Xing and Kolstad (1998). This hypothesis actually reveals the relationship between level
of production and level of pollution from a different angle: countries with lower
environmental standards are usually countries with low incomes, the investment from the
polluting industry will degrade the environmental quality in these countries. While for
higher income countries from which these dirty industries come, the environmental
quality will be improved, if they do not relax their environmental standards.
In short, the production level is a function of both pollution level, d, which in turn
is a function of e , and GDP per capita. Because the business tax is based on the
manufacturing level, we have that the business tax is a function of both e and GDP per
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capita I, namely, V = V (e, I ) . 79 Therefore, we have Ve' (e, I ) < 0 , which captures the
effects of government behavior of pollution control on the business tax. To expand the
tax base and gain higher tax revenue, the government has incentives to lower e .
On the other side of Leviathan’s revenue coming from the property tax, two
factors should be examined carefully. First, the higher production level is not a free lunch.
Though a higher-level production can expand the base of the business tax, the pollution
coming with it will damage the value of the real estate properties. This would lower
Leviathan’s revenue from property tax, given property tax rate τ p . Therefore, the
property tax base is a function of government efforts to control pollution. We assume
Pe' (e) > 0 before some point and Pe' (e) < 0 after that. The reason P is concave in e is

that when e increases initially, pollution decreases and the value of property goes up.
When e , however, is too high, the production level becomes lower, which means that
the environmental restrictions put too much pressure on production activities and even
lead to the exit of some firms. The pessimistic prospect for the job market drives people
away to other localities, and then the demand on the property, such as housing, will be
lower, which will lead to the drop in property value. Second, the value of property is
significantly influenced by GDP per capita. The property value will increase as GDP per
capita increases. To model the effects of these two factors, we have the following
equation, namely, P = P (e, I ) . Therefore, we will have
∂p
∂p
< 0 afterwards. Also we have
> 0.
∂I
∂e
79

We need to note that the relationship between V and I is non-linear.

∂p
> 0 before some point and
∂e
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About the demand for health care, H, we also need to consider two factors. The
first one is still the pollution level. In order to harvest the revenue increase resulting from
the boom in the production level, however, the government needs to pay a price that it
may face a bigger heath bill resulting from the higher pollution levels, since
higher-pollution level can expose residents to an unhealthier environment and they will
have a higher chance of getting sick., No matter to what extent a government spends on
the health care service for its residents, increased pollution will more or less drive up
public health expenditure since it is one of the basic public services governments are
obligated to deliver. What is more, a small increase in the pollution level can possibly
significantly increase the chances of residents being negatively affected by the pollution.
So the government’s expenditure for health protection is also a function of government
efforts to control pollution e . We will have H e' (e) < 0 and H e'' (e) > 0 .
The demand for health care is a normal good in the sense that as people get richer,
namely, as GDP per capita increases, they will usually demand more and better health
care services. Meanwhile, government has more resource available and so is able to
spend more on health care as income increases. So the demand for health is a function of
both the government efforts of pollution control and GDP per capita, H = H (e, I ) .
In the context that we discussed above, the Leviathan’s problem becomes the
following

Max
e

α ⋅τ v ⋅ V (e, I ) + β ⋅τ p ⋅ P (e, I ) − γ ⋅ H (e, I ) − G

(1)
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Where τ v is the tax rate for the business tax, τ p is the rate of property tax.

α , β and γ are pre-determined parameters, measuring the extent of the
government levy taxes on the economic resource and the extent of the government taking
care of the health of the residents. For example, the Leviathan government may be
obligated to pay the entire health care bill; or, alternatively, the Leviathan may decide to
pay nothing. If γ is defined as the share of health care expenditure the Leviathan takes
as its responsibility, γ ∈ [0,1] . If γ = 0 , the government pays nothing for the health bill.
If γ = 1 , then the government pays the entire bill. 80 Same are true for α and β , which
can be taken as the weights of revenue sources given to the business tax and property tax,
respectively. Similarly, if α = 0 , the government does not levy the business tax; if α = 1 ,
then the government exhibits a fierce collection on the business tax. If β = 0 , the
government does not levy property tax; if β = 1 , then the government relies heavily on
property tax as its revenue source and therefore exerts great collection efforts.
The first-order condition (FOC) to this revenue maximization function is 81

α ⋅τ v ⋅Ve' (e, I ) + β ⋅τ p ⋅ Pe' (e, I ) − γ ⋅ H e' (e, I ) = 0

(2) .

The government behavior on the efforts of pollution control is governed by the FOC (2).
From the above equation, e can be denoted as a function of all the other variables in (2)

80

Here the case of health care is different in that usually governments are paying more or less for the health care of the
resident, therefore in general we should expect 0 < γ < 1 ; unlike the weights to VAT and property tax, which can take
the value of zero since some countries don’t levy VAT or property tax. We don’t differentiate here.
81

The last term in the object function disappears in the FOC because, according to our assumption, that G is not

related to the government efforts

e.
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e = e( I ,τ v ,τ p , α , β , γ )

(3)

From this revenue maximization problem, we can derive the following
propositions:
Proposition I, for any given per capita income I , budget structure or the
constitution in the sense of the first essay matters in pollution control. The effort devoting
to pollution control, and therefore, according to our assumption, the pollution level, is
determined by the constitution. The constitution, following what we used in the first
essay, states whether government has business taxes or residential taxes, and how
obligated it is to provide services to mediate the health effects of pollution, and etc.
Proposition II, for any given per capita income I , if α > 0 , β = 0 and γ = 0 ,
the revenue maximizing Leviathan will have no incentive to control pollution. For the
proof, please see the Appendix B-1
Proposition III, for any given per capita income I , if α = 0 , β > 0 and γ > 0 ,
and the pollution level is high (which means e is low), the Leviathan will have strong
incentives to control pollution. But the extent of pollution control is subject to some
constraints and can not be too high. There exists an optimal level of pollution control.
For the proof, please see the Appendix B-2.
If all the three parameters α , β and γ are in the range of (0, 1), without taking
the extreme values, we would expect the optimal level of pollution control is achieved by
balancing the revenue and expenditure associated with the pollution level. Specifically,
the optimal condition is governed by the FOC (2) above, or

123

α ⋅τ v ⋅Ve' (e, I ) + β ⋅τ p ⋅ Pe' (e, I ) = γ ⋅ H e' (e, I )

(2' )

As the pollution affects government behavior from both the revenue side and the
expenditure side of the budget, the interaction between the two sides of the budget makes
the problem even more complicated. For example, if a government does not need to
spend much on healthcare and relies heavily on the pollution production activities (from
which government can collect the business tax), it may even try to attract those
high-pollution industries into its jurisdictions in order to increase their tax bases. Bidding
for “dirty” industries could be a “good choice” under those circumstances, given the
assumption of government strategic behavior. However, if with the same level of
expenditure responsibility on health care, while most tax revenue is from property tax,
the government will be interested in maintaining higher environmental quality. We can
see the outcomes of the interaction more clearly through the following table.

Table A Different Incentives under Different Budget Structures
Share of Public Health Expenditure
High
Low
Main
Component of
Revenue
Source

Tax collected from
pollution production
activities (Business
related taxes)

Trade-off

Lowest incentives

Property tax

Highest incentives

Trade-off

124

According to the Table above, we will expect some interactions between budget
structure and government behavior of pollution control. The model above covers the
relationship among business related taxes, the property tax and health expenditure and
their interaction in a comprehensive framework. To summarize, if we make the
assumption that the government’s effort of pollution control can effectively achieve
desired pollution level, we can formulate the following three hypotheses,
Hypothesis I:
Higher proportion of tax revenue collected from business related taxes gives
government weaker incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, higher ratio of
business related taxes over total tax revenue will result in lower effort of pollution
control and higher pollution level.
Hypothesis II:
Higher proportion of tax revenue collected from property tax gives government
stronger incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, higher ratio of property tax
over total tax revenue will result in higher effort of pollution control and lower pollution
level.
Hypothesis III:
A fuller assignment of expenditure responsibilities on health gives government
stronger incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, the higher the ratio of
public health expenditure over total expenditure, the stronger incentive of pollution
control and the lower the pollution level.
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In the following section, we test empirically the three hypotheses using a
cross-section time series data set.
Data and Methodological Issues
Model specifications
Starting from our previous hypotheses, we investigate whether differences in the
budget structure have an impact on the government’s incentive to control pollution. More
specifically, we want to see how effort towards pollution control, and therefore in turn,
how the pollution level is affected by the incentives from the budget structure,
exemplified by the shares of business related tax and property tax in total tax on the
revenue side, in conjunction with the share of health expenditure in total government
expenditure on the expenditure side. 82 Thus, our equation takes the following form:
M i ,t = f (Re v, Exp , Gov , Control )

(1)

where M i ,t is the level of total emissions for the aforementioned four air
pollutants, Rev is a vector of variables that affect level of pollutions from the revenue
side of the budget, Exp includes variables from expenditure side of the budget. Gov is a
vector that captures the characteristics of the government, and control includes some
variables controlling for the basic conditions of the country. We will explain the relevant
variables included in each of these categories below.
In order to capture the effects of incentives on the revenue side on the
government behaviors, we use both data on business related taxes and property tax in our
82

This is under the assumption that the government’s policy can always achieve the desirable outcome.
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estimation. Therefore, Rev includes Iratio, Cratio and Lratio. Iratio is the ratio of
revenue from business related taxes over total revenue. According to our hypothesis I, the
expected sign for the coefficient on this variable is positive in that higher ratio of
business related taxes will lead to a lower effort of pollution control and thus a higher
pollution level, due to the government’s motive of pursuing higher tax revenue.
For property tax, the ratio of property tax over total revenue at both the central
level and local level are adopted, since in our sample, property tax either constitutes the
main revenue source of local government, or goes to the central government’s coffer . 83
We use Cratio to denote the ratio of property tax over total tax revenue collected by
central government and regional government. Lratio is the ratio of locally collected
property tax over total local government tax revenue. According to our hypothesis II, the
expected signs of Cratio and Lratio are both negative. Our earlier analysis argues that the
damage to the property tax is more evident at the local level; therefore we would expect
the effect of Lratio to be more important. In other words, a bigger share of property tax
in local tax revenue would lead to the local government to exert a higher effort of
pollution control, and therefore result in a lower pollution level, and vice versa. The
property tax ratio for the central and regional governments might not have the same
effects, since the higher level government has a broader tax base than local government,
and the negative consequence of pollution on property tax base will not be as substantive.
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In a lot of countries, government is divided into central, regional (state or province,), and local government. In that
case, we group central and regional government into central government.
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In order to capture the effects of pollution on the expenditure side of government
behavior, we use the ratio of government’ healthcare expenditure over total public
expenditure, Hratio in Exp in equation (1). 84 This variable measures to what extent the
government is allocating fiscal resources to healthcare. A higher Hratio means that
governments spend higher shares of resources on public health services; thus the
government will have incentive to exert higher efforts to control pollution, in order to
save on the expenditure outlet. Lower Hratio means that governments do not have
obligation to spend much on public health, and thus have less incentive to control
pollution. We anticipate this variable to have a negative effect, meaning a higher share of
public expenditure on healthcare would give government more incentive to lower the
pollution level.
As mentioned above, the EKC hypothesis does not take into account the role of
the government. However, in our framework, we are trying to identify whether
governments play important roles in influencing environmental performance. One of the
important policy conjectures we can investigate is whether the relationship between
budget structure and government incentive in pollution control is more evident in
democratic countries than in non-democratic countries. In order to test whether or not the
political characteristic of the government play a role in the process of pollution control,
we include a variable dem, which measures the extent of democracy in the country.

84
Our data set doesn’t differentiate between local government’s healthcare expenditures and those of the central
government, mainly due to the data availability. Actually in most of the countries, central governments are at least
partially responsible for the healthcare, except in very few countries such as China.

128

Following this line of analysis, it will also be helpful to control for the quality of
governance. In our model we assume that the government intention of pollution control,
and the policy instruments governments employ can achieve the desirable outcomes. This
is a very strong assumption, and empirically we can relax it. In order to do this we need
to control for some measure of governance. Only countries with good governance can
possibly achieve the desired policy objectives. In our context, only countries with good
governance can achieve the goal of reducing pollution to the desired level, a point that
Dasgupta, et al (2004) make in their study. In a country with corruptive government,
even when it has the incentive to control pollution, it might not be able to achieve the
goal. Here we use cpi, the corruption perception index as the measure of governance.
Both dem and cpi are included in Gov in equation (1).
In addition, we include in our model some other variables to control for the
characteristics of each country, which we denote in the model with Control. Firstly, in
our model, per capita GDP enters our regression. We assume that, as a public good,
environmental quality is a normal good. In other words, as GDP per capita increases, the
demand for environmental quality also increases (North 1990), and government is not
only obligated to provide better quality of environment, but also can afford to do so when
income level is higher. Therefore, GDP per capita enters our regression as an explanatory
variable, denoted by pgdp. We also control for population in a country, pop, since more
population will bring about possibly more economic activities and thus more pollution
than countries with less population. But if population is spread out in a big country,
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pollution should be lower than when population is concentrated in a small country.
From this perspective, the land area, land, is included in the model. We include each
variable separately.
Therefore, with all variables explicitly, our model takes this reduced form:
M i ,t = β1 + β 2 Iratioi ,t + β 3Cratioi ,t + β 4 Lratioi ,t + β 5 Hratioi ,t + β 6 demi ,t + β 7 cpii ,t
+ β 8 pgdpi ,t + β 9land i + β10 popi ,t + vi ,t

(2)

In our model, the vi ,t is a composite error term, which can be alternatively
formulated in a way that includes country heterogeneity, which we denote by ci, and u i ,t ,
the idiosyncratic disturbance term. ci captures country specific effects that do not vary
over time. Usually for time series cross sectional data, we would also consider time effect,
which changes over time. However, as we will see later on, we have few countries for
which many time periods of data are available, so we mostly conduct one-way error
component analysis.
Data
Environmental Indicators
In the prevailing EKC literature, different kinds of pollutants are used to test the
validity of the reversed U shape phenomenon, including air pollutants, water pollutants,
deforestation, and so on, with a special interest in air pollution. We follow this tradition
and use air pollution data to do our empirical test. Here for our purpose of empirically
investigating the relationship between budget structure and environmental performance,
we choose the following pollutants NOx, CO, SO2 and CO2 as our environmental
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indicators. The reason is that they have different environmental and health impacts.
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), six principal pollutants
considered harmful to public health and the environment, also called "criteria" pollutants,
have been set in National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Ozone, Particulate Matter
(PM), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Dioxide (NOX), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and lead.
We obtain cross sectional time series data for three of them, NOX, CO and SO2. In
addition, CO2 is included due to the fact that data for CO2 is the most readily available.
Even though it does not damage human health in any direct way, it is the major
contributor of global warming and has significant impact on environment. Due to their
different impacts on human health as well as on environment, government may have
different incentives in controlling their emission levels. 85 Also due to the different
properties of these pollutants, aggregating might obscure some of the individual effect.
Therefore, we will look at the relationship between pollution level and budget structure
of each pollutant separately. Most of the EKC literature deals with individual pollutants,
too.
Mainly due to data availability, we do not make distinctions whether these
pollutants are from production process or other processes, and use the total yearly
emissions of a particular pollutant in a country instead. This could bring about potential
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According to the information on the EPA website, CO affects human health by reducing the level of oxygen
delivered. It is especially harmful to people with heart disease if at lower level, but will harm healthy people at high
level. It also contributes to smog formation. NOx has serious health and environmental effect since the nitrogen oxides
family has a lot of compounds and derivatives that contribute to smog, acid rain, particles that deteriorate human health,
worsening water quality, global warming, formation of toxic chemicals, and leading to visibility impairment. SO2
affects human health by damaging respiratory organs and functions. It is also conducive to the formation of acid rains,
accelerating the decay of building and statute, changing negatively water and plant system and so on. For more detail,
please visit http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair (last accessed on Dec. 05, 2005).
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measurement error problems since air pollutants can flow across countries and total
emissions might not accurately measure the extent of the pollution in a country at some
point of time. A similar issue is that pollution can flow across different regions within a
country, thus emissions at national level will not capture the extent of the pollution in
different localities. 86 Nonetheless, keeping these points in mind, the measure of total
emissions should provide us a starting point for the relationship between pollution level
control and government budget structures.
Data Sources
The data used in our empirical analysis come from several different sources. The
data of dependent variables, level of pollutants including CO, NOx and SO2 are from
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse Gas
Inventory (GHG) Database, including data for a total of 108 countries, during the year of
1990-2002. 87 In addition, we obtain CO2 data from the World Development Indicator
(WDI), 2004.

The pollutant data from UNFCCC are measured by total emission for a

particular pollutant with the unit of gigagram, which is an equivalent measure of
thousand metric tons that is used for CO2 from WDI. 88
The data for the explanatory variable, ratios of taxes on the revenue side of the
budget, Iratio, Cratio and Lratio, are from IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS).
We use the general value added, sales, or turnover taxes in GFS as the measure of
86

In this sense, it is reasonable to take into consideration the geographical characteristics of a country, as Dasgupta, et
al (2004) and others did in their works. We didn’t control this, nor could we carry out spatial analysis due to the limit
of our dataset and the unbalanced nature of it.
87
The GHD database contains more than 108 countries, but we leave out those countries with too limited data, and we
end up have 108 countries.
88
The UNFCCC includes data for CO2 as well. However, data from WDI give us more observations. Therefore we use
CO2 from WDI instead.
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business related tax in our estimation, thus the Iratio is the share of general value added,
sales, or turnover taxes over total tax revenue. Cratio and Lratio are the shares of
property tax in total tax at the central (and regional) and local level, respectively. The
data for expenditure side of the budget, the expenditure ratio of central government on
the health over total expenditure, Hratio, is from various issues of World Health Report
published by World Health Organization (WHO).
For the measure of government, Gov includes two variables, dem and cpi. The
measure of democracy, dem is calculated with the two measurements of freedom from
the “Freedom in the World” survey by the Freedom House: political rights and civil
liberties. The former measures how freely people are involved in the political process,
while the latter measures individual freedom of expression, rule of law, etc. Both of these
two measurements are measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 denoting highest freedom. In
order to capture the freedom both in the political sphere and personal life, we follow
Dailami (2000) and use linear combination of these two to convert the measure of
freedom to be within the range of [0,1], with 0 denote the least free. 89 Since people from
democratic countries generally enjoy more freedom than people from non-democratic
countries in that in the latter, the authoritarian way of decision making deprives people of
much freedom, we use the extent of freedom to measure the degree of democracy. This
measure of democracy gives a rough idea of how democratic the country is from a
special angle.
89

The formula Dailami (2000) used to convert is Dem = (14- score of political rights – score of civil rights)/12 .
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The other measure of government, cpi, corruption perception index, is from
Transparency International (TI). This measure is a survey-based composite measure of
the extent of corruption, instead of a comprehensive measure for the quality of
governance, which can not provide a precise measure whether or not an intended policy
can achieve desired results; therefore it might not be an ideal proxy for our purpose. In
addition, the index measures how corrupted countries are perceived to be, which not only
gives the cpi an ordinal nature, but also makes it vulnerable to the cultural, democratic
and economic backgrounds of the businesspeople and country analysts being surveyed as
well as to the survey methodology change over time. However, this measure focuses on
public sector corruptions, defining corruption as the “abuse of public office for private
gain,” which at least partially possesses the characteristics of the governance indicator
that we are trying to capture. 90 Besides, compare with other measures, this index gives us
more degrees of freedom. 91
For the control variables, Control includes GDP per capita, land areas, and
population, which are all from WDI, 2004. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
variables used in the estimation. More detailed explanations of each variable are
presented in Table 2.
We adopt panel data estimation because it has the advantage of pooling
cross-section and time series data and thus increases degrees of freedom, which not only

90

This is according to the definition of TI.
Other measurements include for example, the corruption control composite by Kaufmann in the WBI, which is
released biannually, from 1996-2004.

91
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mitigates our problem with limited data, but also partially deals with potential omitted
variable bias by controlling for unobserved effects (Baltagi 2001; Wooldrige 2002). 92
Ideally we would have data for 108 countries spanning over years 1990-2002. However,
missing values especially for the dependent variables and tax variables leave us
unbalanced panel dataset with at best less than 100 observations.
A closer look at the dataset gives us a clearer idea of what data we can actually
use in our estimations. Among the four pollutants we are working with, CO2 has the
biggest sample size; NOx and CO has the same size, while the size for SO2 is the smallest.
Due to missing values, for most countries our data do not have many time periods
available. The availability of the pollutants data and the tax data enable us to estimate the
relationship between tax structure and pollution level within the range of 1995 to only
2000 for CO2 and to 2001 or 2002 for the other three. Few countries have data available
for all these years. Countries with longer horizons in the dataset include only Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark and Switzerland for NOx and CO (less Canada for SO2), and
include additionally 5 countries including Bolivia, Mexico, Norway, Poland and Thailand
for CO2. These limits on the data restrict us from applying more estimation techniques
and favor performing some of the specification tests. Consequently, as we will see later,
we empirical estimations are based on simple regressions.
Empirical Estimation Issues

92

In theory panel data can achieve this; however, it is not necessarily as effective for our dataset, due to the poor
quality of our dataset. Nonetheless, it can at least partially remedy the problem.
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Econometric Estimation Issues
Endogeneity Problem
There are some potential endogeneity problems in our estimations. Our model
predicts that as the share of health expenditure in total public expenditure, Hratio rises,
the government will have greater incentive to control pollution, and therefore the
pollution level should be lower. However, the high Hratio could be the consequence of
high pollution level: when more people get sick because of the increased pollution level,
government will have to spend more on health care and thus drive up Hratio. If this
relationship is true, then we will encounter an endogeneity bias in our regression.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem for ratio of health expenditure,
we use a Hausman test to test for endogeneity, using as an instrument life expectancy at
birth. 93 Following Castineira and Nunes (1999), Posnett and Hitiris (1992) and others,
we tried different instrument variables, including share of population over 65 in total
population, number of physicians in per 1000 people, number of hospital beds in per
1000 people, share of education expenditure in total expenditure, share of military
expenditure in total expenditure, and etc. Only share of education expenditure and life
expectancy at birth are significant in the first stage regression. We finally choose life
expectancy at birth as our instrument because education expenditure imposes further
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The life expectancy at birth and all other variables are from World Development Indicator (WDI), 2004.
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restrictions on our sample size in the regression. In Table 3, we can see that the life
expectancy at birth is significant in the first stage regressions for all four pollutants. 94
The null hypothesis for the Hausman is that the estimates from OLS and
instrumental variable are not significantly different from each other. If we do not have
evidence to reject the null of no difference, it is possible the OLS estimates are not badly
biased. As illustrated in the last two rows in Table 3, in our estimations, the test statistics
we obtain are not significant to reject the null for any of the four pollutants. Thus we can
draw the conclusion that in our sample, there is no evidence of endogeneity. 95
Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
We can write our model in the general form
y i , t = X i ,t β + v i ,t = X i , t β + c i + u i , t

For the panel dataset we have, the first thing we need to decide is whether we
should choose fixed effects regression or random effects regression. The key criterion is
whether unobserved effects ci, or the country heterogeneity is correlated with the
explanatory variables X i ,t . If ci is orthogonal to or uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables, we can treat ci as random by putting ci into the error term. The appropriate
estimator is generalized least squares (GLS) estimator based on the composite error

94

Since all the explanatory variables are the same for all four pollutants, we should obtain the same results in first
stage regressions in all cases. However, our sample sizes are different among different pollutants, which explains why
the results are the same only for NOx and CO, while for SO2 and CO2, results are different.
95
Note this Hausman test is sensitive to the chosen instruments. If the instrument is poor and the test statistic lacks
power, it will not be able to reject the null and the model will be misidentified due to the presence of the endogeneity
problem.
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term ci + ui ,t . 96 If ci is correlated with the explanatory variables X i ,t , then fixed effects
regression is necessary.
In considering the roles of geographical characteristics play in affecting pollution
level, we believe fixed effects regression be better to account for these effects that are not
changing over time. However, lack of data makes it infeasible to conduct fixed effects
regression. Therefore, we assume that in the general form model, ci is uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables and apply random effects regression.
Error Structure
Another important issue is that because different components of the dataset are
from different data sources, thus we would not expect that error terms to possess the
property of E[v ] = 0 and Var[v] = σ 2 . Recall that v is the composite error, and almost
certainly E[vi2 ] ≠ E[v 2j ] . If we follow most of the EKC studies and do OLS regressions,
heteroskedasticity problem will arise and consistent but inefficient estimates will be
produced, which raises the necessity of testing for the heteroskedasticity. We use the
robust standard errors to correct for the heteroskedasticity in our pooled least squares
regressions. In the panel data regressions, we also correct for heteroskedasticity by
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), assuming the idiosyncratic error terms take
some special structures, which we will discuss in more detail in Appendix A.
Additionally, due to the time series in the data, there is a potential dynamic
process. The emissions in this year could be due to the same reasons for the emissions
96

As we will explain in detail later, the way of treating u i ,t can take the general form or random effect regressions.
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last year, or the year before. Due to the limitations on our dataset, we do not have
sufficient time series data to deal appropriately with the dynamic structure, but hope we
can remedy this in the future once better data become available.
Regression Results
We use several estimation strategies. First, in order to compare our hypothesis
with those original EKC studies, we follow Panayotou (1993)’s estimation model to
examine the relationship between pollution indicators and GDP, GDP square with our
data. From the outcomes we can determine if our data provide support to the EKC
hypothesis. However, even though we are following the log linear functional form, we
need to be mindful that the data we used in this study is different from what Panayotou
used in 1993 since we have an unbalanced panel dataset.
Therefore, first we estimate the following equation using the total emissions of
pollutants:

Ln( M i ,t ) = β1 + β 2 pgdpi ,t + β 3 ( pgdpi ,t ) 2 + ε i ,t .

(3)

Here M i are the emission levels of CO, CO2, NOX and SO2, pgdp is per capita GDP. 97
Our results show that our data set are conformable to the EKC framework in that
all the quadratic forms are negative. We report the results for these regressions in Table 4.
Then we test the three hypotheses by adding the six variables Iratio, Cratio,
Lratio, Hratio, dem and cpi, as well as some control variables that we mentioned earlier,
to the list of explanatory variables and estimating the following equations:
97

From here we can see that our equation is different from what Panayotou (1993) used in his paper.
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Ln( M i ,t ) = β1 + β 2 Ln( Iratioi ,t ) + β 3 Ln(Cratioi ,t ) + β 4 Ln( Lratioi ,t ) + β 5 Hratioi ,t
+ β 6 Ln(demi ,t ) + β 7 Ln(cpii ,t ) + β 8 Ln( pgdpi ,t ) + β 9 Ln(land i ) + β10 Ln( popi ,t ) + vi ,t

(4)

We still follow this log linear functional form, taking the logarithm of the
dependent and independent variables except for the ratio of health expenditure. 98 We
estimate 4 different models for each of the pollutants here. Model 1 is the pooled OLS
regressions. Model 2-4 are the random effects regressions, since, as we tested earlier by
Hausman specification test, random effects are preferable to fixed effects for our data. 99
Model 2 and model 3 are the traditional random effects regressions, a special form of
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which takes the country heterogeneity into
account and we take to be the most appropriate models for our dataset. The difference
between model 2 and 3 is that in model 3, we include a time trend to account for the time
specific effects. Model 4 is the more general form of FGLS regressions. In the Appendix
A, we explain in more detail the difference between the special FGLS, the random effects
model (REM) in model 2 and 3 and the general FGLS in model 4.We assume the error
structure is heteroskedastic and try to correct for the potential heteroskedasticity in model
4. The results are presented in Tables 6-9.
From Table 5 we can see that, in all 4 models, the share of business related taxes
has a positive and statistically significant impact on pollution levels, which provides
support to our hypothesis I. Since we are using logarithm transformations, it is easier to
interpret the results. We can see the magnitude of the relationship between pollution and
98
Usually we don’t take logarithm of ratios. In considering of the relationship between pollution level and ratio of
taxes is not linear, we multiply the tax ratios by 100 and then take logarithm of them.
99
Except for SO2 that is weakly significant, as we discussed before.
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business tax ratio ranges from 1.29-1.98 percentage points, which means that the increase
in one percentage point in business tax ratio will result in pollution level increase by
1.29-1.98 percentage points. The effects of property tax share at local level have small,
but negative and significant impacts, which support our hypothesis II. The magnitude
ranges from 0.3-0.4 percentage points. Coefficients of property tax ratio at central and
regional level are mixed and imprecisely measured, which conformsto our earlier
conjecture. Ratios of health expenditures always correctly give negative signs, usually
with a magnitude of much bigger than business tax ratio and local property tax ratio
except in model 3, even though only in model 4 is it significant. 100 This provides some
supporting evidence for our hypothesis III.
The measure of democracy gives us systematically positive signs. This suggests
that with this measure of democracy, we can say that the environmental policy control is
performing worse in democratic countries than in non-democratic countries, at least with
the pollution data of NOx in our sample. Given our results, it seems that the incentive of
tax structure on government’s pollution control works better in non-democratic countries.
The measure of governance, corruption perception index, gives mixed results. In the first
3 models, the coefficient signs are negative, meaning countries with good governance
should have better environment or less pollution, but the effects are not significant. One
explanation might lie in the inadequacy of our dataset; in particular, our sample size may

100

We did not take the logarithm of the health expenditure ratio, therefore we need to take caution when interpreting
and comparing the results.
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not be large enough. In addition, these two measures might not be able to capture the
political characteristics and quality of governance very well. We hope that better
measurements can be used in the future.
For the control variables, population and per capita GDP are always positive and
significant, meaning more populated countries and richer countries have higher level of
pollution, which is intuitive. Given the high correlation between per capita GDP and
democratic measure, our positive results of democracy are not a surprise: countries with
higher income are usually more democratic, and also these countries have more serious
pollution problem. 101 Land area is always negative and mostly significant, suggesting
that NOx gets dispersed as the country becomes bigger. The time trend in model 3 is
negative and significant, meaning level of NOx decreases over time. As we will observe
later, for the other three pollutants, time trends always exhibit a strong negative pattern.
From Table 6 we can see that, for the pollutant CO, we generally have the similar
story as NOx, with smaller magnitude for business tax ratio and similar for central (and
regional) property tax ratio and health expenditure ratio. But in the two random effects
models 2 and 3, business tax ratios are not significant. In addition, local property tax
ratio and per capita GDP do not have expected good and significant results; neither does
the land area exhibit the strong relationship as it does for NOx. However, the health
expenditure ratio is always negative and significant in two out of the 4 models. Results

101

The pair wise correlation between per capita GDP and democracy is 0.585, and highly significant.
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for democracy and corruption perception index are still mixed, and usually the
coefficients are not significant.
Table 7 indicate that, the results for SO2 are not as good as those for NOx and CO.
The coefficients for business tax ratio differ by big scales depending on model, while the
local property tax ratio and health expenditure ratio exhibit the similar trend as NOx and
CO. The business tax ratios are only positive and significant in model 1. Ratios of
property tax at local level have correct signs only in model 3 but not significant. Health
expenditure ratio is only significant in the random effects model 2, even though it is
negative in 3 of the 4 models. However, the unexpected big magnitude of the coefficient
in model 2 is suspicious. For democratic measures, the coefficient gives negative signs in
all 4 models in this case, meaning that the democratic countries control emissions of SO2
better than non-democratic countries, however the signs are not significant. For
governance measures, except in model 2, we usually have positive and significant
coefficients. According to this, countries with good governance or less corruption will
have higher levels of SO2. Per capita GDP usually has significantly negative signs in this
case, which means richer countries tend to have less SO2. When we take into account that
richer countries usually are those countries with less corruption, we encounter a
contradiction here. However, SO2 is mainly from heavy industries and is different from
other pollutants, which might be part of the reasons for the difference in the estimations.
Besides, we have the smallest sample size for SO2, which might contribute to these poor
results. The time trend is again significantly negative.
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Table 8 records the results for CO2. We can see from this table that CO2 is the
pollutants that we have the biggest sample size. As it illustrated, business tax ratio are
always positive, but only significant in model 4, with the scales smaller than the other
pollutants. Different from the pollutants that we dealt with earlier, for CO2, both property
taxes at central and regional level and at local level are negative. Health expenditure ratio
does not always exhibit negative signs as other pollutants do and the scales are smaller,
too. This can be explained partly by the fact that CO2 is not directly detrimental to human
health, therefore it does not have as strong effects on health expenditure as other
pollutants. Levels of CO2 are surely higher where economic activities are more
prosperous, as both people’s livelihood and production activities contribute to the level of
CO2. However, due to the special role of CO2 in greenhouse effects, it is one of the most
important contributors to global warming, thus gives every level of government great
incentives to control the emission level. The serious consequences of global warming
make it even more important for the higher level government than for local government
to control level of CO2, which partly explains the different effects on property tax ratios
for central and local governments from other pollutants. Measure of democracy does not
give us systematic results in this case either. But corruption index are generally positive
and significant in 2 models, meaning in countries with good governance or less
corruption, level of CO2 is higher, which is an unexpected result. Coefficients of
population, per capita GDP, and land areas are generally positive and significant,
meaning countries with more prosperous economic activities, higher population and
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higher income usually have higher level of CO2, which does not have the contradiction as
in the case for SO2.
Therefore, as a summary illustrated in table 9, we report the results from model 3,
our preferred model, for all four of the pollutants that we are considering here. Most of
our regressions provide evidence supporting our hypotheses, though in some cases the
evidence is not very strong. We observe that higher ratio of business related taxes in tax
revenue, lower share of property tax in tax revenue at local level, and lower share of
public health expenditure over total public expenditure are associated with higher
pollution level and vice versa. The strong time trends show that pollution decreases over
time.
We could not obtain evidence whether or not the environmental policy is different
for democratic countries and non-democratic countries, nor could we obtain the effect of
governance on pollution control. These results call for better measurements. But
meanwhile, it is possible that the incentive of budget structure to government
environmental control works for both the democratic countries and non-democratic
countries.
Conclusion
In this study we are trying to obtain evidences to support the proposition that the
government budget structure can influence government incentives and therefore has
effects on the provisions of public goods, with environmental quality as the example.
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence we obtained in this study provides supports
to our three hypotheses, even though the quality of the dataset and measurements of
certain variables need improvement. We establish that the government incentives and
budget structure can have some impacts on government behavior. And according to our
empirical results, it works regardless of the political characteristics of the countries.
Therefore, for the purpose of dealing with environmental problems, in addition to other
direct and indirect regulations, incorporating government budget structure into the
process of decision-making may be a good choice. More specifically, transition from
relying on business related tax system to employ property tax to a broader extent and
adopting government-financing healthcare system may be conducive to improving
environmental performance. We can see that the policy implication of traditional EKCs
that economic growth will cure environment problem by itself, and then “grow first,
clean up later” is misleading.
Governments are the same as individuals and firms in that they all have their own
interests and respond to different incentives. Government incentives and governments’
strategic behaviors under different incentive schemes should be given full consideration
when making policy decisions.
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Table 1. Summary of Statistics

Variable
Nitrogen Oxides
(NOx)
Carbon Monoxide
(CO)
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)
Carbon Dioxide
(CO2)
Ratio of Business Tax
Ratio of Property tax
at Central Level
Ratio of Property tax
at Local Level
Population
Ratio of Health
Expenditure

Observations

Mean

477

1129.89

478

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

3566.588

0.08

22860

5438.914

18040.28

0.02

130580

409

1055.501

3097.563

0.01

20936

1136

144157.7

544707.8

0

5600000

613

0.376824

1.347949

0

17.05926

511

0.031641

0.033209

6.48E-06

0.171187

378

0.476918

3.598491

7.99E-06

70.02703

1404

2.40E+07

3.96E+07

770000

2.88E+08

864

10.89664

4.519649

1.6

28.9

Deviations

Democracy

1383

0.601772

0.307262

0

1

Per Capita GDP

1381

7001.864

10769.6

84.73576

46894.91

470

5.219468

2.463203

0.4

10

1365

799957.1

2085717

670

1.69E+07

Corruption Perception
Index
Land Area
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Table 2. Explanations of Variables

Variables

Label

Pollution level measured
by total emissions of

NOx

NOx
Pollution level measured
by total emissions of CO
Pollution level measured
by total emissions of SO2

CO

SO2

Pollution level measured
by total emissions of

CO2

CO2
Ratio of VAT revenue in
total tax revenue

Unit
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons
Thousand metric
tons

Iratio

in percentage

Cratio

in percentage

Lratio

in percentage

pop

No. of people

Ratio of public health
Hratio
dem

Per capita GDP

pgdp

Land areas

Gas Inventory (GHG) Database
United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse
Gas Inventory (GHG) Database

IMF Government Finance Statistics
(GFS), 2004
IMF Government Finance Statistics
(GFS), 2004
IMF Government Finance Statistics
(GFS), 2004
World Development Indicator Database
(WDI), 2004

in percentage

published by World Health Organization
(WHO)

Democracy

index

Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse

Various issues of World Health Report

public expenditure

Corruption perception

United Nations Framework Convention on

(WDI), 2004

revenue

expenditure over total

Gas Inventory (GHG) Database

tons

Ratio of local property tax

Population

Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse

World Development Indicator Database

revenue
revenue in total local

United Nations Framework Convention on

Thousand metric

Ratio of central property
tax revenue in total central

Source

[0,1]

Freedom House

In constant 1995

World Development Indicator Database

dollars

(WDI), 2004

cpi

[0,10]

Transparency International

land

Square kilometers

World Development Indicator Database
(WDI), 2004
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Table 3. Endogeneity Test Results

NOx

CO

SO2

CO2

First stage results:
Dependent variable: Ratio of Health Expenditure
Ratio of Business

-0.514

-0.514

-2.115

-0.544

Tax

(0.55)

(0.55)

(1.57)

(0.56)

Ratio of Property

0.254

0.254

0.238

0.327

tax at Central Level

(1.05)

(1.05)

(0.98)

(1.17)

Ratio of Property

-0.893

-0.893

-0.620

-0.987

tax at Local Level

(2.60)***

(2.60)***

(1.62)

(2.64)***

0.004

0.004

-0.497

0.100

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.87)

(0.20)

0.674

0.674

0.711

0.539

(3.21)***

(3.21)***

(3.30)***

(2.18)**

-1.583

-1.583

1.356

-4.880

Population
Life Expectancy at
Birth
Democracy

(0.17)

(0.17)

(0.14)

(0.49)

-0.705

-0.705

-1.471

-0.593

(0.99)

(0.99)

(1.72)*

(0.56)

Corruption

0.040

0.040

1.132

0.487

Perception Index

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.80)

(0.26)

0.123

0.123

0.705

0.142

(0.43)

(0.43)

(1.52)

(0.48)

-28.739

-28.739

-20.221

-22.198

(1.89)*

(1.89)*

(1.27)

(1.32)

54

54

50

48

R-squared

0.62

0.62

0.61

0.64

χ2

1.28

4.08

0.00

1.50

0.9985

0.9060

1.000

0.9972

Per Capita GDP

Land Areas
Constant
Observations

IV test

P-value

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4. Simple Regressions Testing EKC Hypothesis

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log of NOx

Log of CO

Log of SO2

Log of CO2

0.012

0.007

0.012

0.019

(5.17)***

(2.93)***

(3.80)***

(8.35)***

-0.024

-0.019

-0.036

-0.030

(5.38)***

(4.12)***

(6.19)***

(6.51)***

4.102

6.458

3.803

8.884

(19.67)***

(30.47)***

(11.65)***

(43.64)***

Observations

472

473

404

1120

Number of Countries

96

97

69

106

Per capita GDP
Square of per capita GDP
Constant

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Regression Results for NOx

Model (1)
Pooled OLS
With Robust se

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

RE

RE w/Time Trend

FGLS/Hetero

Dependent Variable: Logarithm of NOx
1.982

1.287

1.448

1.945

(6.94)***

(2.83)***

(3.39)***

(9.65)***

Ratio of Property tax

0.004

-0.020

-0.032

-0.007

at Central Level

(0.12)

(0.26)

(0.45)

(0.25)

Ratio of Property tax

-0.394

-0.300

-0.360

-0.357

at Local Level

(4.59)***

(1.97)**

(2.51)**

(6.03)***

Ratio of Health

-0.048

-0.071

-0.001

-0.048

Expenditure

(1.50)

(1.40)

(0.01)

(2.38)**

Ratio of Business Tax

1.515

1.409

1.374

1.477

(19.29)***

(8.75)***

(9.21)***

(24.21)***

1.557

0.412

0.659

1.699

(3.39)***

(0.50)

(0.81)

(2.41)**

0.472

0.572

0.437

0.394

(3.46)***

(2.37)**

(1.85)*

(4.55)***

Corruption Perception

-0.066

-0.263

-0.092

0.274

Index

(0.17)

(0.70)

(0.24)

(1.37)

-0.321

-0.390

-0.345

-0.285

(3.62)***

(2.81)***

(2.66)***

(3.89)***

Population
Democracy
Per Capita GDP

Land Area

-0.073

Time Trend

(1.97)**
-24.170

-20.003

-19.617

-23.794

(9.69)***

(4.77)***

(5.01)***

(13.93)***

Observations

64

64

64

64

R-squared

0.90
18

18

18

Constant

Number of Countries
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. Regression Results for CO

Model (1)
Pooled OLS
With Robust SE

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

RE

RE w/Time Trend

FGLS/Hetero

Dependent Variable: Logarithm of CO
Ratio of Business Tax
Ratio of Property tax

0.619

0.312

0.502

0.827

(3.05)***

(0.75)

(1.42)

(7.05)***

0.028

-0.004

-0.010

0.018

at Central Level

(0.86)

(0.06)

(0.16)

(0.87)

Ratio of Property tax

-0.119

0.001

-0.056

-0.134

at Local Level

(1.21)

(0.00)

(0.48)

(3.02)***

Ratio of Health

-0.072

-0.056

-0.004

-0.091

Expenditure

(2.07)**

(1.23)

(0.07)

(5.98)***

1.061

0.999

0.975

1.096

(14.30)***

(6.65)***

(8.02)***

(20.78)***

0.266

0.126

0.281

-0.128

(0.49)

(0.17)

(0.39)

(0.50)

0.347

0.340

0.243

0.358

Population
Democracy
Per Capita GDP

(3.46)***

(1.54)

(1.23)

(5.41)***

Corruption Perception

-0.409

-0.444

-0.305

0.093

Index

(1.37)

(1.33)

(0.92)

(0.68)

0.012

-0.043

0.005

0.046

(0.17)

(0.33)

(0.05)

(0.90)

Land Area

-0.058

Time Trend

(1.75)*
-13.794

-11.558

-11.703

-16.187

(6.73)***

(2.99)***

(3.61)***

(15.01)***

Observations

64

64

64

64

R-squared

0.87
18

18

18

Constant

Number of Countries
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 7. Regression Results for SO2

Model (1)
Pooled OLS
With Robust SE

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

RE

RE w/Time Trend

FGLS/Hetero

Dependent Variable: Logarithm of SO2
0.915

-0.010

0.170

0.690

(1.76)*

(0.02)

(0.32)

(1.55)

Ratio of Property tax

-0.108

0.022

0.002

-0.097

at Central Level

(1.36)

(0.26)

(0.03)

(1.69)*

Ratio of Property tax

0.057

0.215

-0.129

0.115

Ratio of Business Tax

at Local Level

(0.39)

(0.80)

(0.56)

(1.16)

Ratio of Health

-0.040

-0.157

0.036

-0.073

Expenditure

(0.66)

(2.70)***

(0.60)

(1.59)

1.155

1.121

1.095

1.121

(4.88)***

(2.76)***

(3.18)***

(5.88)***

-1.394

-0.468

-0.356

-0.939

(1.43)

(0.67)

(0.64)

(1.04)

-0.422

-0.383

-0.697

-0.678

(2.05)**

(1.06)

(2.29)**

(3.63)***

Corruption Perception

1.189

-0.256

0.368

1.390

Index

(2.35)**

(0.75)

(1.24)

(2.95)***

0.198

-0.025

-0.001

0.286

(0.89)

(0.06)

(0.00)

(1.50)

Population
Democracy
Per Capita GDP

Land Area

-0.166

Time Trend

(5.22)***
-16.603

-6.955

-5.620

-13.942

(3.56)***

(1.05)

(1.02)

(3.61)***

Observations

57

57

57

57

R-squared

0.83
17

17

17

Constant

Number of Countries
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8. Regression Results for CO2

Model (1)
Pooled OLS
with Robust SE

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

RE

RE w/Time Trend

FGLS/Hetero

Dependent Variable: Logarithm of CO2
0.057

0.056

0.057

0.210

(0.35)

(0.57)

(0.60)

(2.68)***

Ratio of Property tax

-0.112

-0.027

-0.031

-0.097

at Central Level

(4.83)***

(1.25)

(1.53)

(7.35)***

Ratio of Property tax

-0.133

-0.100

-0.118

-0.065

at Local Level

(2.32)**

(1.60)

(1.97)**

(2.03)**

Ratio of Health

0.035

-0.015

-0.002

-0.003

Expenditure

(1.60)

(1.72)*

(0.26)

(0.29)

0.969

0.929

0.953

0.969

(22.82)***

(8.58)***

(8.93)***

(44.75)***

-0.114

0.040

0.093

0.072

(0.57)

(0.56)

(1.31)

(0.50)

0.177

0.344

0.370

0.226

(1.27)

(4.02)***

(4.42)***

(3.66)***

Ratio of Business Tax

Population
Democracy
Per Capita GDP
Corruption Perception

0.843

0.095

0.039

0.849

Index

(2.61)**

(0.96)

(0.41)

(5.35)***

0.116

0.128

0.120

0.158

(2.87)***

(1.69)*

(1.61)

(9.65)***

Land Area

-0.022

Time Trend

(3.03)***
-9.229

-8.404

-8.733

-10.386

(6.67)***

(5.58)***

(5.91)***

(18.36)***

Observations

99

99

99

99

R-squared

0.92
27

27

27

Constant

Number of Countries
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

154

Table 9. Summary for the Results of Model 3

NOx

CO

SO2

CO2

(+)

+

+

+

-

-

+

-

(-)

-

-

(-)

-

-

+

-

Population

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

Democracy

+

+

-

+

(+)

+

(-)

(+)

-

-

+

+

Land Area

(-)

+

-

+

Time trend

(-)

(-)

(-)

(-)

Ratio of Business Tax
Ratio of Property tax at Central
Level
Ratio of Property tax at Local Level
Ratio of Health Expenditure

Per Capita GDP
Corruption Perception Index

Note: we use + to denote positive coefficients and – for negative ones. Where the results are
significant, we put them in bold and also in parentheses.
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Appendix A General Form Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS)
and Random Effects Methods (REM) 102
Consider the model in the general form
y i ,t = xi ,t β + vi ,t , t = 1, 2, ..., T

Or, y i ,t = xi ,t β + ci + u i ,t , t = 1, 2, ..., T
Where ci is the unobserved country heterogeneity and time-invariant.
As we already explained, the differentiation between fixed effects regressions and
random effects regressions mainly lies in whether or not the unobserved effects ci is
correlated with the observed explanatory variables x i ,t , t = 1, 2, ..., T. According to the
results of Hausman specification test we performed, it is necessary that we treat ci as
uncorrelated with x i ,t , and therefore we should follow random effects estimation.
The random effect estimation is the weighted average of the within (or fixed
effects) regression and between regression. To illustrate, we take the model above,
y i ,t = xi ,t β + ci + u i ,t , t = 1, 2, ..., T

(1)

And take the averages of the function, we then have
y i = xi β + ci + u i , t = 1, 2, ..., T
Where y i = ∑t

y i ,t
Ti

, x i = ∑t

x i ,t
Ti

(2)
, and u i = ∑t

u i ,t
Ti

(2) – (1), we will have
( y i ,t − y i ) = ( xi ,t − xi ) β + (u i ,t − u i ) , t = 1, 2, ..., T

102

In this part, we mainly follow the notation used in Wooldridge (2002), chapter 7 and chapter 10.

(3)
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Applying OLS to estimate (3), we can get fixed effects estimators (or within
estimators), and applying OLS to (2), we will have between estimators. The random
effect regression is the weighted averages of the within and between estimator, which can
take the form of
( y i ,t − θy i ) = ( xi ,t − θxi ) β + (u i ,t − θu i ) , t = 1, 2, ..., T

(4)

With θ be the weight put on the between transformation. θ takes the value of
[0,1]. When θ = 0 , the random effects regression becomes OLS; while when θ = 1 , the
random effects regression becomes the fixed effects regression.
In estimation process, we usually use generalized least squares (GLS) to estimate
the random effect estimators. And depending on the assumptions we make, we can carry
out general form GLS or the random effects model (REM) that we traditionally deal
with. 103 In GLS regressions, we assume that the unobserved effects ci is uncorrelated
with the observed explanatory variables, or Ε( X it′ ci ) = 0 . However, since ci stays the
same within the panel in each time period t, the composite error v i ,t will be correlated
across time. In addition, the fact that vi ,t depends on ci for all time periods makes this
correlation not fade along the increase of the time span.
In addition, in REM we assume that the idiosyncratic error is serially uncorrelated
and homoskedastic, or Ε(u it2 ) = σ u2 and Ε(uit uis ) = 0 for all t ≠ s , t = 1,2,..., T .
Therefore, the serial correlation comes only from ci . And if we denote Ε(ci2 ) = σ c2 , we
103

This follows the language in Wooldridge (2002). Here the general form GLS is so called simply because it is more
generalized than the REM. Special assumptions still have to be made for the idiosyncratic error terms in order to
perform the regressions, however.
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will have that Ε(vit2 ) = Ε(ci2 ) + Ε(u it2 ) = σ c2 + σ u2 , and
Ε(vit vis ) = Ε[(ci + u it )(ci + u is )] = σ c2 .

Therefore, under REM, the variance matrix will take the following form

⎛ σ c2 + σ u2
σ c2
L
σ c2 ⎞
⎟
⎜
σ c2 + σ u2 L
M
⎟
⎜ σ c2
Ω = Ε(vi vi′ ) = ⎜
M
M
O
σ c2 ⎟⎟
⎜
⎜ σ2
L
σ c2 σ c2 + σ u2 ⎟⎠
c
⎝
If we have I T as the identity matrix, and J T J T′ as the T × T matrix with unity in
every element, we can write the above matrix in the form
Ω = σ u2 I T + σ c2 J T J T′

Then under this assumption, we only need to estimate two unknowns for each T ,

σ c2 and σ u2 . There are different methods of estimating σ c2 and σ u2 , as discussed in
Wooldridge (2002) and Hsiao (2003). Then, using this variance matrix, we can obtain the
FGLS estimator by the following formula
−1

βˆ

RE

N
⎛ N
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟ ⎛⎜ ∑ X ′Ω
ˆ −1 y ⎞⎟
= ⎜ ∑ X i′Ω
i
i
i
⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎝ i =1

This is what we did in our regression model 2 and 3. As we mentioned before, the
difference between 2 and 3 is that we include year dummies in model 3, in order to take
into account the time effects. Even though we generally do not have many time periods
available, it is more appropriate to take the time effect into consideration. We do not
report the dummies in the result tables, however. Due to the nature of the panel data set
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we have, even though unbalanced, we deem these two models are more appropriate for
our analysis, especially model 3. 104
However, if we do not assume the composite errors vit are composed of country
heterogeneity ci and idiosyncratic errors u it , with the latter well-behaved as in REM,
we will need to use the general FGLS. We will use the form
−1

β̂ FGLS

N
⎛ N
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟ ⎛⎜ ∑ X ′Ω
ˆ −1 y ⎞⎟
= ⎜ ∑ X i′Ω
i
i
i
⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎠

N
ˆ = N −1 ∑ vˆˆ vˆˆ ′ , and vˆˆ = y − X βˆˆ is the pooled OLS residuals.
Where Ω
i
i
i
i i
i =1

At one extreme case, if we assume vit is i.i.d, we will have that β̂ FGLS is the
same as pooled OLS, β̂ SOLS . As the other extreme, for the most generalized form, we
basically need to estimate each element of the variance matrix; with a total of
T (T + 1) / 2 if we do not make any specific assumptions. But in general, there is a robust

variance matrix available and takes the form
N

N

N

i =1

i =1

i =1

ˆ −1 X ) −1 (∑ X ′Ω
ˆ −1vˆ vˆ′Ω
ˆ −1 X )(∑ X ′Ω
ˆ −1 X ) −1
A var(βˆ ) = (∑ X i′Ω
i
i
i i
i
i
i

However, usually for the general GLS, we assume that the composite error vit
take some special form, which will ease our regression a lot. For example if we assume
that the composite errors are heteroskedastic, we can correct for the heteroskedasticity by
specifying the relevant variance structures. This is what we did in our model 4. Since we
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And the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects gives us significant results for random
regressions with all four pollutants, which confirms the existence of country heterogeneity (Breusch and Pagan 1980).
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have a cross section time series dataset, we assume that the variance for each panel differ,
which results in heteroskedasticicy.
More specifically, in model 4, we assume that Ε(u it2 ) = σ u2i , or there is a unique

σ u2 for each panel and different across panels, therefore we need to estimate the unique
i

σ u2 for each group. We also assume for simplicity that Ε(vit vis ) = 0 . The variance
i

matrix will then take the following form
⎛ σ u21
⎜
⎜ 0
Ω = Ε(vi vi′ ) = ⎜
⎜ M
⎜ 0
⎝

0

σ

2
u2

M
L

L 0 ⎞
⎟
L M ⎟
⎟
O 0 ⎟
0 σ u2n ⎟⎠

Or, to write in a matrix form, it will be Ω = σ u2i I T .
Thus in model 4, in addition to σ c2 , it is necessary to estimate the σ u2i for each T.
In this case, the variance matrix will take the form Ω = E (u i u i′ ) + σ c2 jT jT′ .After
pooled OLS estimations, these covariance estimates and autocorrelation parameters are
not difficult to obtain. And the FGLS estimation with the specially structured Ω can be
obtained relatively easier.
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Appendix B Proof of propositions
C-1. Proof of Proposition II.
In this case, the F.O.C is τ vVe' (e, I ) = 0 the only chance for Ve' = 0 is e = 0 .
The government has no incentive and thus provides zero effort in pollution control,
which means that the pollution level will be very high.

V = V (e, I )

whereVe' = 0

0

e

C-2. Proof of Proposition III.
In this case, the F.O.C is

β ⋅ τ p ⋅ Pe' (e, I ) − γ ⋅ R ⋅ H e' (e, I ) = 0 .
To make this equation hold, since we have P is concave in e , or Pe' (e, I ) > 0
before some point e' and Pe' (e, I ) < 0 after that; while H is convex in e, or H e' (e, I ) < 0 ,
the only possible solution has to be on the part that Pe' (e, I ) < 0 .
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Property tax base/demand on health

H e' ( e , I )

Pe' (e, I )
0

e’

e*

e

If pollution level is high, which shows that the government effort e is low, then
increase in e would increase the value of property and save on the expenditure on
health care at the same time, as illustrated in the diagram above, for the part before e’ .
Therefore, the government has great incentive to increase e and control pollution.
However, the government can not increase e too much. If the government effort e
becomes so high that it not only lowers the pollution level and reduces the expenditure
on health, but also at the same time drives down the property value, as illustrated in the
diagram for point beyond e’, the government will have to balance the gain from saving
on health expenditure and loss from drop in property tax. We would expect the
equilibrium to be achieved at point e*, while H and P are cotangent to each other. At e*
we have that the gain from savings on expenditure on healthcare is equal to the loss of
property tax resulting from the lower property values.
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